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ARTICLE

WHOSE WATER IS IT? PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
AUTHORITY OVER RECLAMATION PROJECT WATER
Reed D. Benson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The American West, for the most part, is an arid place. The
average annual precipitation in the seventeen western states1 is
twenty-one inches, but in many places is far less.2 Often there is
too little water to go around, even in places such as Oregon that
are commonly believed to be wet.' Water is valuable everywhere
because it is indispensable; it is even more precious in the West
because it is scarce.
J.D., University of Michigan, 1988; B.S., Iowa State University, 1985. The author is
Reclamation Issues Director for WaterWatch of Oregon, a nonprofit environmental group
based in Portland. He can be reached at WaterWatch at 213 SW Ash #208, Portland, OR
97204, phone (503) 295-4039, fax (503) 295-2791.
1 The seventeen western states with Bureau of Reclamation water projects are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See
*

U.S.

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ACREAGE

LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS

ch. 3, at 2 (1996)

[hereinafter BUREAU EIS].
2 See id. at 45.
3 As stated recently by Oregon's water management agencies:
The soggy winter and spring climate of Oregon's northwest quarter have
given the state a reputation for water abundance that obscures an important
fact: each year the State's water supply falls far short of the demands placed
on it. Across Oregon, many streams are dry in the summer and fall months.

Significant natural flow reserves for new or expanded uses do not exist. In
many places, sufficient flows for existing uses do not exist - and haven't for
decades. In more and more areas, we are facing uncertainties about groundwater reserves. All over the state, prospective users are competing for the last
drops of available water. Put very simply, there is not enough water where it
is needed, when it is needed, to satisfy existing out-of-stream and instream
uses. This situation seriously limits the ability of Oregon's economy to grow
and threatens the long-term sustainability of the very ecosystems our economy relies upon.
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Where there is water-in the West, it is often supplied by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation ("the Bureau"). The Bureau delivers
about thirty million acre-feet 4 of water in the seventeen western
states, which is roughly double the annual yield of the Colorado
River and six-sevenths of the annual yield of the Snake River.5
Over eighty-five percent of that water goes to irrigation, and the
great majority of the irrigation water is delivered to lands in California and the Northwest. One in every five irrigated acres in the
seventeen states obtains at least some of its water from the
Bureau.7
While the Bureau has traditionally served irrigation above all
other purposes, and continues to do so, in recent years the Bureau
has become more responsive to other water needs and users. The
Bureau more than doubled its deliveries of water for municipal and
industrial uses from 1970 to 1991.8 In addition, the Bureau is paying increased attention'to the long-neglected interests -of Indian
tribes, as well as to the need for instream flows to support fish and
wildlife, water quality, and recreation. Under former Commissioner Dan Beard, the Bureau officially embraced the principle of
moving water into new uses in support of the public interest. 9 The
Bureau has often encountered opposition, however, from farmers
and their allies who seek to continue using Bureau water for established irrigation.
Conflicts over Bureau water involve a wide range of issues, and
are played out in various arenas. Ultimately, though, nearly all the
conflicts come down to a single question: who has the right to say
how Bureau water will be used? In other words, whose water is it?
4 An acre-foot is enough water to cover one acre of land one foot deep - about 326,000
gallons.
5 See TIM PALMER, THE SNAKE RIVER: WINDOW TO THE WEST 5 (1991).
6 In 1991, Idaho, California, Washington, and Oregon, in that order, collectively
received more than 72% of the Bureau's total output of irrigation water. Arizona, Wyoming, Colorado and Montana received another 18%. The other nine states combined
received less than 10% of Bureau irrigation water. See BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, ch. 3, at
2.
7 The Bureau delivered irrigation water to over 9.1 million acres in 1991. See id. at 1.
8 The Bureau's municipal and industrial deliveries increased from 2 million acre-feet in
1970 to 4.2 million acre-feet in 1991. The states receiving the largest blocks of municipal
and industrial water from the Bureau in 1991 were Arizona, California, and Nevada. See
id. at 1, 5.
. 9 The Bureau in 1993 adopted a set of guiding "organizational principles," the first of
which was to "facilitate changes from current to new uses of water in accordance with state
law when such changes increase benefits to society and the environment." U.S. BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 1 (1993) (on file with author).
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This Article explores that important and deceptively simple
question. The initial pages provide a basic grounding in the reclamation program and the nature of federal "project water." The
bulk of the Article examines the correlative rights and duties of
state governments, individual water users, irrigation districts, and
the federal government with respect to Bureau water. The Article
devotes particular attention to several fairly recent cases from the
Ninth"Circuit Court of Appeals that shed new light on the question
of who controls the water from Bureau projects.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Reclamation Program

The federal government launched its program to "reclaim" the
arid lands of the West through large-scale irrigation water development when it passed the Reclamation Act of 1902.10 Under the
reclamation program the government would build dams, canals,
and other facilities to make water available for the irrigation of
small family farms. The U.S. Interior Secretary would build these
projects on federal lands and be responsible for their operations. 1
Courts interpreting the 1902 Act have found that Congress
clearly intended to promote social goals as well as agricultural
production:
With the Reclamation Act, Congress created a blueprint for
the orderly development of the West, and water was the
instrument by which that plan was to be carried out....
...As the Supreme Court observed in [Ivanhoe Irrigation
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958)], Congress clearly
intended the federal reclamation program to promote the
growth of an agricultural society in the West "by limiting the
quantity of land in a single ownership to which project water
might be supplied." 357 U.S. at 292. And as [the Ninth Circuit] has said, the Reclamation Act of 1902 was animated by
three primary goals: "to create family-sized farms in areas
irrigated by federal projects . . ., to secure the wide distribution of the substantial subsidy involved in reclamation
10 Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.
from § 371 to § 498) (1994).
1 See Peterson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978)).
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projects and [to] limit private speculative gains resulting
from the existence of such projects."'"
While Congress' primary goal was to supply subsidized water to
irrigate small family farms, the Bureau of Reclamation's main mis-3
sion turned out to be building dams and other large facilities.1
The Bureau became known as the builder of the West's most
fabulous dams, including Hoover and Grand Coulee, but those are
only the most famous facilities of a remarkably prolific agency.
Today, reclamation project facilities in the seventeen western states
include 347 storage reservoirs, 254 diversion dams, 268 major
pumping plants, over 25,000 miles of canals and pipelines, over
37,000 miles of distribution laterals, and over 17,000 miles of
4

drains.1

The Bureau built these facilities after obtaining water rights
under state law. The facilities store, release, divert, and deliver
water -

"project water" -

for irrigation and other uses. But pro-

ject water is not free for the taking by any water user, even one
with water rights under state law. Rather, project water is delivered only through federal contracts - typically, contracts between
the Bureau and an entity known as an irrigation district - which
provide for water deliveries in exchange for certain payments. Districts.receive water under these contracts and deliver it, subject to
patrons,
certain terms and conditions, to their patrons. These
15
mostly irrigators, are the end users of project water.
12 Id. at 802-03 (quoting United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1119
(9th Cir. 1976)).
13See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 145-68 (revised ed., Penguin Books 1993)
(1986). Reisner states:
Within its first thirty years, [the Bureau] had built about three dozen projects.
During the next thirty years, it built nineteen dozen more. . . . 'By 1956, Congress had voted 110 separate authorizations for the Bureau of Reclamation,
some encompassing a dozen or more irrigation projects and dams. Of these,
seventy-seven - nearly three-quarters - were authorized between 1928 and
In that astonishingly brief twenty-eight-year period between the
1956 ....
first preparations for Hoover Dam and the passage of the Colorado River
Storage Project Act, the most fateful transformation that has ever been visited on any landscape, anywhere, was wrought.
Id. at 165-66.
14See BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, ch.3, at 3. The great majority of these facilities were

built by the Bureau, although some were constructed using loans under the reclamation
program and others were built privately. See id.
15 As Professor Sax has explained it,
The process frequently begins with a purchase or appropriation of the necessary water rights by the United States. Then dams, reservoirs, and transmission structures through which project water will be captured and distributed
are built. The United States no longer (though it once did) deals directly with
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Control and Ownership of Project Water

Who has the power to determine the use of reclamation project
water? Or, put another way, who owns project water? At least
three factors complicate the ownership issue.
First, ownership is shared by several parties. The entire package
of rights in reclamation project water can be thought of, as with
other property rights, as a "bundle of sticks." In most cases, the
sticks of the project water bundle are divided among at least four
entities: the federal government, the state, the district, and the end
user. Most of this Article is devoted to exploring the correlative
rights, and some of the responsibilities, of these four entities. It is
not always clear which entities hold which sticks.
This last point brings up the second source of complexity. The
four entities' rights and responsibilities with respect to project
water are not the same everywhere. These rights and responsibilities may vary by state, by project, by district, and even by user
within a district. State laws,. federal project authorizing statutes,
and reclamation contracts vary widely. And with seventeen states,
perhaps three hundred projects, and nearly six hundred districts
involved in the reclamation program, 6 the potential differences are
enormous.
The third difficulty with the question, "Whose water is it?," is
that the answer may depend on another question: "Why do you
want to know?" The context of the inquiry matters; that is, exactly
who wants to control the use of the project water and to what end?
As Professor Thompson has stated, "[t]he general views of a court
regarding 'ownership' of water rights can be quite misleading when
applied to specific questions without any sense of context. For a
variety of reasons, it is important to analyze each question individ' 17
ually and not fall back on the simplistic talisman of 'ownership.""
the ultimate water users. Instead, it enters into what is known as a repayment
contract with a state entity known as a conservancy or irrigation district. The
function of the district is-to act as an intermediary between the United States
and the ultimate user, contracting with individuals for allotments within the
projects, administering the distribution of water, and collecting taxes and user
fees to pay annual maintenance expenses as well as the capital repayment due
to the United States.
JOSEPH SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY, 119-20 (1968).
16 See BUREAU EIS,supra note 1, ch. 3, at 2. A recent Bureau publication noted that
the total number of districts in the program increased from 572 in 1984 to 592 in 1993. See
id. at 7.
17 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Relevance of Water "Ownership" to Water Markets
and Other Issues 8 (June 1993) (unpublished paper presented at a conference at the Natural Resources Law Center in Boulder, Colorado, on file with author). Frank Trelease has
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"Whose water is it?," then, is a complicated legal question
.requiring case-by-case analysis. And the matter is certainly not just
academic. The issue of who controls project water has been and
continues to be the crux of many court cases and public policy

debates in the West. In many instances, irrigators and states have
challenged the Bureau's authority over project water. Consider
these few recent examples:
9 The Bureau has failed to implement a strong water conservation
program for federal projects and disclaimed its authority to determine how conserved water will be used, stating that districts and
18
state law would determine the disposition of conserved water;
* When the Bureau reallocated water from irrigation to fish and
wildlife uses on California's Central Valley Project as required by
Congress, irrigators sued to block the reallocation, claiming they
had constitutionally protected rights to the water; 19

* The Bureau promised to correct rampant "water spreading" (the
use of project water on unauthorized lands or for unauthorized
purposes) but suspended its efforts after irrigators challenged the
Bureau's authority to take action against the practice;"°
also suggested that notions of ownership in the abstract are not particularly helpful in sorting out water issues:
It must always be remembered that when we say "alakazam," or "state ownership," or "the state holds in trust," no genie out of a bottle brings us a
beautiful maiden draped in pearls, and no magical solution is provided for
difficult problems of adjusting the relations of an individual to the state or of
the state to the federal government in the complex field of development of
water resources.
Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638,
654 (1957).
18 See BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 6, ch. 4, at 114.
19 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Cal.
1993), affirmed sub nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
20 Former Commissioner Dan Beard promised a congressional committee in 1994 that
he would move against unauthorized uses of project water. See Water Use Practices on
Bureau of Reclamation Projects: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on NaturalResources, 103d Cong. 32 (1994) [hereinafter Reclamation
Hearings]. Attorneys representing irrigators, however, have questioned the Bureau's
power to stop such uses. See id. at 210-23 (testimony of Gail Achterman, Oregon Water
Resources Congress). Environmentalists, on the other hand, have argued that the Bureau
has a duty to halt water spreading and to reallocate water that has been put to unauthorized uses, at least in some circumstances. See id. at 232-45 (testimony of Reed Benson,
WaterWatch of Oregon). The Interior Department Inspector General's office has criticized the Bureau for allowing project water to reach ineligible recipients. See Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Audit Report, Irrigation of Ineligible Lands,
Bureau of Reclamation, Report No. 94-1-930 (1994), reprinted in Reclamation Hearings,
supra, at 264-89.
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* After the Bureau announced its intent to implement an operating plan for the Klamath Project that would temporarily make
more water available to meet fishery and tribal needs, an Oregon
Assistant Attorney General opined that the Bureau had no authority to do so. 2 1 ,
This Article does not address the merits of current, specific
issues such as these. Nor does it attempt to make the definitive
statement on complex matters such as water right takings or federal-state relations under the reclamation and water laws. Instead,
the Article provides a basic overview of important rights and
responsibilities of water users, districts, and the state and federal
governments regarding reclamation project water. With this overview, the reader may have an easier time analyzing specific issues
and 22finding case-by-case answers to the question, "Whose water is
it?"

III.

THE NATURE OF RECLAMATION PROJECT WATER

In most respects, water from a federal reclamation project is just
like any other water. The two kinds of water behave the same way,
whether they are flowing in a river, stored behind a dam, or
diverted into an irrigation canal. A hydrologist could not tell them
apart, nor could an irrigated plant or a fish. Under the law, however, reclamation project water is different from the rest.
For nearly twenty years, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
clearly and consistently held that project water is not like other
kinds of water:
A distinction must be recognized between the nature of
nonproject water, such as natural-flow water, and project
21

Letter from Stephen E.A. Sanders, Oregon Assistant Attorney General, to Martha

Pagel, Director, Oregon Water Resources Congress, DOJ File No. 690-002-G0037-86-0010
(Mar. 18, 1996) (on file with author). The Interior Department eventually issued its own
opinion, setting forth its authority and duties in managing the Klamath Project. Memoran-

dum from David Nawi & Lynn Peterson, Solicitors, Dep't of Interior, Pacific Southwest
Region, to various Interior Department officials (Jan. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Regional Interior Solicitors Memo] (on file with author).
22 For a thorough discussion of reclamation project water issues in all their contextual
complexity, see generally NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, RESTORING THE WEST'S
WATERS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1996). Volume II of this
work explains in some depth the factual and legal background of six major reclamation
project areas, and explores how issues of project water use have unfolded in those areas.
The study concentrates on efforts to address environmental problems associated with reclamation project water use, such as diminished habitat for threatened and endangered species, degraded water quality resulting from irrigation drainage, and depleted tribal and
recreational fisheries.
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water, and between the manner in which rights to use of
such waters are obtained. Right to use of natural-flow water
is obtained in accordance with state law. In most western
states it is obtained by appropriation - putting the water to

beneficial use upon lands. Once the rights are obtained they
vest, until abandoned, as appurtenances of the land upon
which the water has been put to use. Project water, on the
other hand, would not exist but for the fact that it has been

developed by the United States. It is not there for the taking (by the landowner subject to state law), but for the giving by the United States. The terms upon which it can be
put to use, and the manner in which rights to continued use

can be acquired, are for the United States to fix. If such
rights are subject to becoming vested beyond the power of

the United States to take without compensation, such, vesting can only occur on terms fixed by the United States.2 3

Thus, the United States has much more control over project
water than over other types of water. This article explores the relative rights and powers of the federal and state governments, irrigation districts, and individual water users with respect to project
water.
A.

What is Project Water?

A simple, straightforward definition of reclamation project water
is elusive and perhaps impossible. Neither case law nor statute
seems to contain one. For most purposes, however, project water
is water diverted, stored, withdrawn, or otherwise taken from its
normal course by a reclamation project. 4
23 Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Flint v. United States,
906 F.2d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 1990); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation
Dist., 626 F.2d 95, 99 (9th Cir. 1980); Central Ariz. Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Lujan,
764 F. Supp. 582, 591 (D. Ariz. 1991). Once project water has been applied to beneficial
use in accordance with the reclamation laws and state water rights, however, the federal
government's control over that water is limited. See infra Part V.B.1.
24 The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-295, 96 Stat. 1263 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to 390zz-1 (1994)), provided a definition of "project," but
not a very enlightening one:
The term "project" means any reclamation or irrigation project, including
incidental features thereof, authorized by Federal reclamation law, or constructed by the United States pursuant to such law, or in connection with
which there is a repayment or water service contract executed by the United
States pursuant to such law, or any project constructed by the Secretary
through the Bureau of Reclamation for the reclamation of lands.
43 U.S.C. § 390bb(8) (1994). The 1902 Reclamation Act did not define "project," but the
Act authorized "the construction and maintenance of irrigation works for the storage,
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Most project water is delivered for specific purposes under contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and a water user organization such as an irrigation district. The organization, in turn,
supplies water to its patrons,25 who typically are irrigators.
Roughly eighty-five percent of project water is used for irrigation
purposes, while municipal, industrial, and miscellaneous uses
account for roughly fifteen percent.26
The Bureau delivers project water under two types of contracts.
The more common is the repayment contract, whereby an organization receives water in return for making scheduled payments on
a portion of the costs of a project. 27 The other type is the water
service contract, whereby an organization pays an agreed rate for
annual water deliveries.28 The repayment contract is analogous to
a mortgage, while a water service contract is more like a lease.29
Some projects have water that is not covered by any contract and
thus not obligated to any user.. Contracts entitle users to a quantity
of water or percentage of storage space in a project reservoir.
Some reservoirs are not fully allocated by these contracts and
therefore have unused capacity, also known as uncontracted
space. 30 Thus, not all project water is controlled by a user or delivered under a reclamation contract.
Conversely, not all water delivered by project facilities under a
Bureau of Reclamation contract is project water. Federal law has
long allowed water users to contract for excess delivery or storage
diversion, and development of waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands." Id..
§ 391 (1994).
25 See 1 WELLS HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
569 (1971).
26 In 1990, the net supply of reclamation project water throughout the West was about
39.3 million acre-feet, of which 19.9 percent was lost in transportation or operational spills.
Of the remaining water, over 26.5 million acre-feet were delivered to farms, while nearly 5
million acre-feet went to municipal/industrial or miscellaneous uses. See BUREAU EIS,
supra note 1, ch. 3, at 53.
27 Repayment contracts are sometimes called "nine D" contracts, because § 9(d) of the
Reclamation Project Act of 1939 sets forth requirements for repayment contracts. See 43
U.S.C. § 485h(d) (1994).
28 Water service contracts are also known as "nine E" contracts, for the section of the
1939 Reclamation Project Act that authorized them. See id.§ 485h(e) (1994).
29 Even a water service contract, however, may convey a permanent right to water. See
Richard Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of Water Project Rights, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q.
773, 836-38 (1987); see also Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir.
1993).
30 See, e.g., RESTORING THE WEST'S WATERS, supra note 22, § 2.12.4.1 (discussing the
sufficiency of uncontracted space to satisfy increased minimum pool requirements in the
Payette Division of the Boise Project, Payette River, Idaho).
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capacity in project facilities. Under these "Warren Act '31 contracts, water users who have their own private water rights can
receive water under those rights through project facilities, and that
water is not considered project water.32
Contracts may also define what is and is not project water in a
particular context. If an irrigation district's use of water from a
particular river predates a federal project on that river, then the
district may contract with the Bureau for water deliveries, but the
contract may specify that water which the district would have
received without the project is not project water.33 Users whose
water rights predate the project may get priority in times of
against other users who receive water only by virtue of
shortage as 34
the project.
Water may be project water even if it issues straight from a
spring, miles from any project facility. Cases both old and recent,
from both state and federal courts, have held that water seeping
from a reclamation project may be project water even if 3it seems to
arise naturally from a spring or stream on private land. 1
B.

Project Water Rights

From the inception of the reclamation program in 1902, the federal government has largely deferred to the western states in matters of water rights and water allocation.36 Thus, a reclamation
31 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-525 (1994). Congress passed the Warren Act, ch. 141,36 Stat. 925, in
1911. For a discussion of the types of agreements the Secretary of the Interior may enter
into as Warren Act contracts, see Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 838-39.
32 See Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 838-39.
33 At least two major cases have involved contracts which impose limitations on the use
of "project water," but not on the use of a district's pre-existing water supply. See Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 285 (1958) (contracts of districts on the Central Valley Project); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1095 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1976) (contract of the Tulare Lake Canal Company).
34 See Westlands Water Dist. v. Patterson, 900 F. Supp. 1304, 1321 (E.D. Cal. 1995),
rev'd, 100 F.3d 94 (9th Cir. 1996).
35 See Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497 (1923); Flint v. United States, 906 F;2d 471 (9th
Cir. 1990); Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 827 P.2d
275 (Wash. 1992). The latter case contains a mildly interesting discussion of judicial tests
for determining when seepage from a project is no longer considered to be project water.
. 36 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994) (Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, declaring
that nothing in the act is meant to interfere with state water use laws); California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (holding that § 8 authorizes states to attach conditions on a
federal reclamation project, as long as the conditions do not violate clear congressional
intent for the project).
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project needs one or more water rights37 from the state in which it
is located, just as any 6ther water project would, although state
power to dictate terms to the federal government is somewhat
limited.38
Many reclamation projects involve water storage facilities, and
the necessary water rights for these projects vary by state. Most
states issue a single water right authorizing water to be stored,
released, and finally applied to a beneficial use. 39 The single water
right is issued in the name of the storage facility owner."' Other
states separate the right to store water from the right to release it
and apply it to a beneficial use.4 ' The "primary" storage permit is
held by the facility owner, while the "secondary" beneficial use
permit is typically held by a water user or an organization of such
42
users.

The Bureau obtained some project water rights directly from the
states, while other rights were acquired from prospective project
beneficiaries. 3 According to the Bureau:
[P]roject water rights to which the United States holds legal
title

.

... may include storage rights, diversion rights, drain-

age rights, and/or ground-water pumping rights. Usually, if
the United States has a vested interest in the project, the
water right is held in the name of the United States. Some
water rights may be held by the water user or by both.'

37 See Filings of Claims for Water Rights in General Stream Adjudications, 97 Interior
Dec. 21, 22-23 (1989) (opinion of Dep't of the Interior Solicitor Tarr) [hereinafter Stream
Adjudications Opinion].
38 See infra Part IV.
39 See Stream Adjudications Opinion, supra note 37, at 22-23.
40 See id. at 23.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 22-23.
43 According to the Interior Solicitor:
[Tlhe Bureau has customarily obtained water rights for reclamation projects
by making application to the appropriate state agency which in turn would
generally grant a single water right for the entire project in the name of the
United States. The Bureau also obtained water rights from those who had
appropriated water for use on lands that ultimately were included within project boundaries prior to authorization of the project. In some instances, project water rights are not held in the name of the United States.
Id. at 25 & n.4.
4 BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, Comments & Responses app. at 124.
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Where the Bureau holds the water rights, its authority over project
water appears to be the same whether it obtained those rights itself
or acquired them from someone else.45
On the other hand, where water rights are not in the Bureau of
Reclamation's name, its authority and obligations with respect to
project water may be somewhat more limited. A 1989 opinion of
the Interior Solicitor interpreted Nevada v. United States46 and
other cases as placing certain duties on the federal government
wherever it holds legal title to project water rights. 7 Where water
rights are not in the name of the Bureau, it is presumably relieved
of these duties, as well as deprived of certain powers. The same
Solicitor's opinion, however, stated that "none of the cases discussed herein should be read to restrict the right of the Secretary to
enforce Federal reclamation or other applicable law with respect to
project water users. "48
IV.

STATE AUTHORITY OVER PROJECT WATER

The Bureau of Reclamation does business in seventeen western
states, all of which assert control over the waters within their
boundaries. Congressional deference to state water law gives these
45 In United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., for example, the Ninth Circuit saw no
significance in the fact that irrigators had pre-existing water rights which they had conveyed to the Bureau:
[T]he lands in the Pine Flat project were not arid, and the lands, the water
rights, and the canals and other irrigation works were privately owned. In
these respects, Pine Flat does not differ from the typical reclamation project.
It is usually true that most of the land included in a reclamation project is
privately owned; it is usually true that the private lands are already under
irrigation through facilities developed at private expense; it is usually true that
the reclamation project only supplements or regulates existing water supplies.
535 F.2d 1093, 1143 (9th Cir. 1976). The Interior Department also makes no distinction
between water rights issued directly to the Bureau and those acquired from earlier appropriators. See Stream Adjudications Opinion, supra note 37, at 24-30.
46 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
47 See Stream Adjudications Opinion, supra note 37, at 27-30. In very general terms, the
Solicitor determined that the federal government is "obligated at least to do what is necessary to preserve, maintain, protect, or have confirmed project water rights that are held in
the name of the United States." Id. at 28. The federal government bears these obligations
even though the beneficial ownership of project water rights is in the water users, not the
United States. See infra Part V.B.
48, Stream Adjudications Opinion, supra note 37, at 27 n.5. The opinion did not squarely
address the question of whether the Bureau's authority to enforce federal laws is circumscribed where it does not hold project water rights. On this point, see United States v.
Tulare Lake Canal Co., 677 F.2d 713, 719-21 (9th Cir. 1982) (Wallace, J., concurring) (finding, and taking exception to, an implication in the majority opinion that acreage limitations
could apply to water stored by a federal reclamation project but previously vested in private landowners), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983).
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states considerable authority over reclamation project water, but
federal supremacy checks the states' power to dictate how projects
are managed and how project water is used.
A.

State Ownership of Waters

In most if not all western states,water is the property of the state
or the people of the state. Public ownership is established by state
constitution, statute, or both.4 9 Public ownership of water in the
western states is expressly subject to rights of appropriation.5 °
Appropriative water rights are strictly usufructuary,51 meaning that
they provide only a right to use the public resource. These rights
have become established through various means, and for various
uses, over the past 140 years. Today, all the western states (except
Colorado, which clings to a judicial scheme) allocate new water
rights through an administrative permitting process. 2
While water in the West is nominally owned by the public, it
tends not to be managed or viewed as a public resource. Water
rights holders generally view the water they use as being their own,
and they stress the private property nature of water rights. Water
management agencies and western state legislatures generally
accommodate the water users.53 State or public ownership of
water has far more meaning on paper than in practice. 4
B.

Limited Federal Deference to States on Project Water Rights

In enacting laws that affect water, Congress has shown great deference to state laws and state control over water allocation.
Respect for state laws was a basic principle of the federal reclamation program from the beginning, as stated in section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act:
49 See
50 See
51 See
52 See

Trelease, supra note 17, at 640-43.
HUTCHINS, supra note 25, at 141.
id. at 142.
DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 156 (1984).

53 See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 5, at 113-39 (exploring the attitudes of irrigators, conservationists, and water officials regarding Idaho water rights and water use).
54 See Trelease, supra note 17, at 640-49. Trelease noted that while the various western
states had said quite different things about water ownership, the differences have made
little practical difference:
In Nebraska the court has said, without taking a breath, that the water is
publicijuris,that its use belongs to the public, that its use is controlled by the
state in a sovereign capacity, and that the state has a proprietary interest, all
without any understanding that it is saying different and inconsistent things
rather than simply redundantly paraphrasing the same concept.
Id. at 642-43.
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Nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested
rights acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed
in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any
way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in,
to, or from any iiterstate stream or the waters thereof.55
The statute further provides "that the right to use of water
acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to
the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right. '' 56 Other federal statutes showing
include
continuing congressional intent to defer to,state water laws
57 and the Clean Water Act.5 8
the McCarran Amendment
Because Congress chose to respect state water laws in section 8
of the 1902 Reclamation Act, projects were required to obtain state
water rights. This requirement presented relatively few conflicts in
the first several decades of the Reclamation program, as most
states were only too eager to obtain federal projects, and state and
federal water development goals diverged little. 9 Things began to
change in the 1950s and '60s, however, as California water users
began seeking to apply state laws which ran counter to basic provisions of reclamation law.
In Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken,6 ° the U.S. Supreme
Court held that, section 8 notwithstanding, state water laws could
not trump directly conflicting provisions of federal reclamation
5543 U.S.C. § 383 (1994).
56 Id. § 372.
57 McCarran Amendment, ch. 651, tit. II, § 208(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 666 (1994)). The McCarran Amendment gave consent for the United States to be
joined in general stream adjudications in state court. See 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994).
58 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. from § 1251 to § 1387). Section 101(g) of the
Clean Water Act provides in part:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or
otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the further policy of Congress -that
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to
quantities of water which have been established by any State.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1994).
59 See Frank Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REv. 464, 467
(1960).
60 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
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law. 61 The Court in Ivanhoe reversed the Supreme Court of California, which had held that the reclamation laws' 160-acre limit on
parcels receiving project water 62 was contrary to state law, and that
section 8 requires state law to prevail over the reclamation laws in
the event of any conflict. 63 Five years later, the U.S. Supreme
Court found in City of Fresno v. California64 that California laws
purporting to grant a preference for domestic uses over irrigation
uses did not bind the Bureau because reclamation laws contained a
specific preference for irrigation.65
The Court went further in these cases, however, and spoke generally to the authority of states to dictate the delivery of project
water. The Court opined that the federal government was generally free from state constraints in operating projects and delivering
project water. As summarized by the Court in Arizona v.
California:
The argument that § 8 of the Reclamation Act requires
the United States in the delivery of water to follow priorities
laid down by state law has already been disposed of by this
court in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, and reaffirmed in
City of Fresno v. California. Since § 8 of the Reclamation
Act did not subject the Secretary to state law in disposing of
water in [Ivanhoe], we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe,
hold that the Secretary must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the Project Act.66
The Supreme Court's decision in Ivanhoe touched off twenty
years of uncertainty and debate regarding state authority and federal obligation with respect to project water rights.67 The Supreme
61 See id. at 291-94.
62 Section 5 of the 1902 Reclamation Act imposed the 160-acre limitation. See 43 U.S.C.

§ 431 (1994). The 1982 Reclamation Reform Act extensively revised federal law on acreage limits. See Peterson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990).
63 See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties & Persons, 306 P.2d 824, 851, 854-55 (Cal.
1957).
64 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
65 See id. at 630-31. Section 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 provides in
part, "No contract relating to municipal water supply or miscellaneous purposes or to electric power or power privileges shall be made unless, in the judgment of the Secretary, it will
not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes." 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c)
(1994).
66 373 U.S. 546, 586-87 (1963) (citations omitted).
67 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. COLO. L.
REV. 49 (1964) (exploring congressional intent as to federal control of reclamation waters
in the wake of the Ivanhoe, City of Fresno, and Arizona v. Californiadecisions); Trelease,
supra note 59 (describing the history and present status of the relationship between state
and federal water laws).
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Court settled much of that debate, and repudiated some of the
dicta of its earlier cases, with its 6-3 decision in California v. United
68
States.
California v. United States came before the Court after California had attached twenty-five conditions to a water right permit for
the New Melones Dam, and the Bureau of Reclamation had challenged the state's authority to impose such conditions.69 The
Bureau relied upon the Court's pronouncements in Ivanhoe, City
of Fresno, and Arizona v. Californiain asserting that a state could
not place limits on the Bureau's use of project water.7 ° Unlike the
state laws at issue in those earlier cases, however, California's conditions on the New Melones Dam permit did not conflict with any
specific provision of federal law. 7'
After an extensive review of legislative history indicating congressional deference to state water laws,72 the Court rejected the
federal government's contention that the state lacked authority to
impose any conditions.73 Notwithstanding the dicta of earlier
cases, the majority found that California could place conditions on
the project permit "which are not inconsistent with congressional
provisions authorizing the project in question. '74 The Court reaffirmed the actual holdings of Ivanhoe and Fresno, however, that
specific congressional directives override conflicting state laws regulating the distribution of water.75 The Court remanded the case
for a determination of whether California's conditions on the New
Melones Dam permit were actually inconsistent with the project's
authorizing legislation.76
438 U.S. 645 (1978).
See id. at 652.
See id. at 672-73.
71 The California v. United States majority thus framed the issue: "Here the United
States contends that it may ignore state law even if no explicit congressional directive conflicts with the conditions imposed by the California State Water Control Board." Id. at
673.
72See id. at 653-70.
73 See id. at 674-75.
74 Id. at 674.
75 See id. at 672 n.25.
76 See id. at 679. In dissent, three Justices argued that the majority had wrongly refused
to follow the Court's earlier cases dealing with § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act. The
dissent explained:
The short of the matter is that no case in this Court, until this one, has
construed § 8 as the present majority insists that it be construed. All the relevant cases are to the contrary ....
Only the revisionary zeal of the present
majority can explain its misreading of our cases and its evident willingness to
disregard them.
68
69
70
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit announced that "a state limitation
or condition on the federal management or control of a federally
financed water project is valid unless it clashes with express or
clearly implied congressional intent or works at cross-purposes

with an important federal interest served by the congressional
scheme. '77 The court thus found a middle ground between the
positions of the state and federal governments. 78 California had
argued that only explicit federal statutory policies, such as those
involved in Ivanhoe and Fresno, could preempt state water law.

The United States, seemingly unwilling to accept the result of the
Supreme Court's decision, had essentially argued that it was not
subject to state conditions.79

Although the United States challenged nineteen of the twentyfive conditions that California placed on the New Melones Dam

permit, it did not present evidence, on remand that any condition
would actually harm or frustrate the purposes of the project. 8° The
court noted potential problems with many of the conditions, but it
had no evidence to show an actual conflict, and most of the conditions were capable of being interpreted or implemented in more
than one way. 81 Thus, tjie Ninth Circuit refused to invalidate any

of California's conditions.82
The Ninth Circuit clearly disapproved of what it saw as the federal government's intransigent stance against the state. Using
Id. at 692-93 (White, J., dissenting).
77 United States v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 694 F.2d 1171, 1177
(9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit was reviewing the district court's decision in United
States v. California, 509 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Cal. 1981), which had been appealed by both
sides. See CaliforniaState Water Resources Control Bd., 694 F.2d at 1174.
78 See Sax, supra note 67, at 57-69 (comparing the federal government's "proprietary
theory" with the states' "veto theory").
79 The court rejected the United States' position "that since it built the dam it need not
justify its operational plans so long as those plans are consistent with the scope of the
project as envisioned by Congress." CaliforniaState Water Resources ControlBd., 694 F.2d
at 1174.
80 See id.
81 See id. at

1177-82.

82 The court found that it was premature to review many of the conditions, which were

not yet implemented and were at least possibly consistent with the congressional scheme
for the project. "It may be that constitutional standards of ripeness are met. Nonetheless,
the parties' actions, as they seek appropriate accommodation of state and federal interests
in the operation of the project, will decisively influence the meaning, and hence the consistency with the [project authorizing] statute, of the conditions." Id. at 1181; see also South
Delta, Water Agency v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 767 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1985)
(ruling that the Bureau of Reclamation, in operating the Central Valley Project, was subject to a California law protecting basins of origin).
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fairly strong language, the court said that sovereigns involved in a
water dispute should not behave that way:
There is a preference, in interstate water cases, for "negotiation," "mutual accommodation and agreement," rather
than litigation. A similar preference applies in cases where
we are asked to arbitrate complicated and delicate questions
of federalism.
In legal terms, these principles require the United States,
at a minimum, to attempt to reconcile its interests with California law before a court can override the state's position as
conflicting with federal policy. The precepts of federalism, if
followed, should produce mutual respect and accommodation for state interests. The congressional scheme and the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in this case make it clear
that such precepts are to be carefully observed here. The
United. States may not justify its demands simply as a raw
exercise of superior authority. It may not be indifferent-to
state interests affected by the operation of an intrastate reclamation project.83
Thus, while acknowledging both congressional deference to state
water law and federal supremacy, the Ninth Circuit - like the
Supreme Court in Californiav. United States84 - stressed cooperative federalism as the guiding principle in matters of reclamation
project water rights.85 Given both the outcome and the language
of the case, neither a state nor the federal government can afford to
insist stubbornly on its perceived legal rights while ignoring the
other's, interests.
C. State Control Over Water Use Under Existing Rights
States have authority to regulate water use under existing rights,
at least to the extent of enforcing limitations specified in state law
and the water rights themselves. State authority over water relies
more on the state's police powers than on notions of state ownership of the resource. "'It has long been the settled law in the arid
83 California State Water Resources Control Bd., 694 F.2d at 1178 (citations omitted).
Some of the interests which California sought to protect through the 25 conditions
included river recreation, wildlife preservation, and water quality. See id. at 1179-80.
84 438 U.S. 645 (1978). As the Court stated in California v. United States, "[i]f the term
'cooperative federalism' had been in vogue in 1902, the Reclamation Act of that year
would surely have qualified as a leading example of it ....
Reflective of the 'cooperative
federalism' which the Act embodied is § 8 .
I..."
Id. at 650.
85 See California State Water Resources Control Bd., 694 F.2d at 1181-82 (noting that
cooperative federalism might accommodate competing state and federal interests and
avoid adjudication).
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and semiarid states that a state, in the exercise of its police power,
may regulate the manner of appropriation and distribution of
water from natural streams for purposes of irrigation.' ' 86 Certainly, states have the authority to require compliance with conditions of the water right itself, such as place, purpose, and season of
use, point of diversion, and rate and duty conditions.87 States also
have authority to restrict water right transfers,88 to enact and
enforce laws providing that water rights will be forfeited for nonuse, 89 and to enforce less specific legal mandates such as "beneficial use without waste." 90
States may exercise this authority over their waters regardless of
whether water rights are owned by an individual or by the United
States, subject to preemptive federal authority. Thus, states regulate the use of project water on more or less the same basis as other
water, except where that regulation would conflict with congressional directives. 91
86 HUTCHINS, supra note 25, at 7 (emphasis added by Hutchins) (quoting Humboldt
Lovelock Irrigation, Light & Power, Co. v. Smith, 25 F.Supp. 571, 573 (D. Nev. 1938)).
87 As Professor David Getches has stated:
The prior appropriation states have all constitutionally or statutorily
asserted their prerogative to administer use of their waters for the benefit of
their citizens. ... These provisions are best understood as asserting sovereign,
rather than proprietary, interests; they establish a state's power and duty to
regulate appropriation of water by individuals under the rubric of state
ownership....

The extent of regulation of the usufructuary [water] right defines the property
interest. The general pattern followed by states is to require that appropriated water continue to be used for the purpose for which it was originally
taken. This purpose is determined when the priority date is established, as
are the quantity, rate of flow, point of diversion, and times when water may
be taken from the stream.
GETCHES, supra note 52, at 86-88.
88 See, e.g., Broughton v. Stricklin, 28 P.2d 219 (Or. 1933) (applying a state statute that
restricted the ability of water rights owners to transfer those rights).
89 See, e.g., Rencken v. Young, 711 P.2d 954 (Or. 1985) (interpreting a state statute that
imposed forfeiture on water rights owners for non-use).
90 See, e.g., Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993) (interpreting the beneficial use element of the standard for confirming existing water rights).
State authority to regulate water use under existing rights may be far-reaching, even
though states are reluctant to exercise it. See Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California
Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1993-94).
91 As stated by one group of scholars:
[S]tates do not own water in the sense of holding property, but they do possess broad jurisdictional and regulatory authority over the water within their
boundaries, subject to the supreme authority of Congress to preempt, or overrule, state laws. . . . One side of the coin, therefore, is that Congress can
override state water laws; the other side of the coin is that state water laws
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In its sovereign role, a state has authority over its waters, and
also has some degree of responsibility. State duties with respect to
water are not very well defined. Under the public trust doctrine,
however, a state's duty to protect public trust resources and values
may be far-reaching. As the California Supreme Court stated in
the leading public trust case involving western water:
The state hag an affirmative duty to take the public trust
into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.... As a matter of practical necessity the state may have
to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses. In so doing, however, the state must bear in
mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking
on the public trust . . ., and to preserve, so far as consistent
with the public interest, the uses protected by the trust.
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public
trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public
interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions
which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or
inconsistent with current needs.
The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allocation decisions even though those decisions were made after
due consideration of their effect on the public trust. 92
V.

THE WATER USER'S RIGHTS TO PROJECT WATER,

PART ONE: WATER RIGHTS

Congress' goal'in passing the 1902 Reclamation Act was not simply to make the desert bloom, but to create and support small family farms. 93 The Supreme Court has stated that reclamation
control until Congress does exercise its superior authority. In the case of
western water, the federal government has left most areas of regulation to the
states - major exceptions include federal water pollution control laws, large
water development projects, and federally guaranteed Indian water rights.
SARAH BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGES AND REDISCOVERY

IN WESTERN WATER POLICY 146 (1993) (second emphasis added).
92 National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (citations omit-

ted). The California court held that the public trust duty applies to all navigable lakes and
streams, and the public trust values include not only the traditional uses of navigation,
commerce, and fishing, but also recreational and ecological values. See id. at 719.
93See United States v.Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1119 (9th Cir. 1976). As
this case illustrates, Congress' Jeffersonian ideals caused it to place significant restrictions
on the use of project water, particularly the 160-acre limitation, which have created some
of the greatest controversies of the reclamation program.
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projects were "designed to benefit people, not land." 94 As the
intended beneficiaries of the reclamation program, water users
have rights to project water that are well protected but also limited.
A.

Water Rights as Property Rights

Whether they receive federal project water or not, irrigators generally regard the water they use as their own private property.
They hold this belief for at least two basic reasons. First, the law
does recognize state water rights as property rights, although as
explained below, these rights may be considerably more limited
than many water users seem to believe. Second, state and federal
water resource agencies have generally done little to control or
restrict existing water uses, so that for decades irrigators have had
a rather free hand.96 Western resource users tend to believe that
any resource they have used for a long time with little regulation is
theirs, even where the law clearly does not recognize that resource
97
as private property.

The basic nature of a water right can be simply stated. "[P]rivate
ownership of stream water while in its natural environment does
not exist; but private rights to abstract and use such waters under State supervision and control in the exercise of its police
powers - do exist, and they are property rights." 9s In the words of
Frank. Trelease:
[P]rivate rights to the use of water in a stream may be
obtained. These private usufructuary rights, like other property, exist by virtue of and are subject to the law of the place
where the stream is located. The state has power over such
private rights in water, power in the sense of sovereignty or
94 Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 297 (1958).
95 See PALMER, supra note 5, at 83-139.
96 The Bureau has systematically failed to require water users to comply with reclamation law and contracts. See infra notes 325-30 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Reed
D. Benson & Kimberly J. Priestley, Making a Wrong Thing Right: Ending the 'Spread' of
Reclamation Project Water, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG., 89, 95-104 (1994) (discussing widespread unauthorized use of project water and the Bureau's failure to address it). States'
enforcement records are less well documented but probably no better. See Karen A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way to Restore Streamflows, 27
ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 7, on file with author).
97 The longrunning controversy over livestock grazing leases on federal lands is a good
example. Western cattlemen often characterize their struggle against the federal government as a matter of property rights, even though the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically
held that a grazing permittee does not acquire a property interest in her permit or in the
increased value that it imparts to her land. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494
(1973).
98 HUTCHINS, supra note 25, at 443.
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imperium, the general power to dictate the laws of property
and to regulate its use.9 9
These scholarly statements as to the nature of water rights present three major points. First, a water right is a right to use a
resource which is in some sense "owned" by another - in this
case, generally by the state or the public. 00° Second, such rights of
use are nonetheless private property. 10 1 Third, water rights are
subject to control by the state under its police powers; the permissible extent of such control by states is explored below.
This notion that water rights are subject to state control, "like
other property,"' 0 2 runs contrary to a common belief among users
that water rights are not like other property, but are somehow
more sacrosanct. Joseph Sax has directly addressed this notion:
Water rights are property, but they have no higher or
more protected status than any other sort of property. Insofar as "there appears to be a broadly held view that a water
right is a special kind of property right which cannot be rega simulated in the same manner as other property rights,"
03
ple response can be given: that view is wrong.'
B. IrrigatorRights in Project Water
Most irrigators who use reclamation project water do not deal
directly with the federal government. Instead, they receive water
through a' delivery organization such as an irrigation district or
canal company, which in turn has made a contract with the Bureau
of Reclamation. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the end
user, rather than the district or the Bureau, is the real beneficiary
of project water. 10 4 However, an irrigator who uses project water is
99

Trelease, supra note 17, at 640.

100See supra Part IV.A.

101The nature of this property right is akin to the right in a trust. Yet, as Trelease notes,
"to deprive [an individual] of this right is said to violate the due process clause and the
equal protection of the laws." Trelease, supra note 17, at 647.
102 Id.

at 640.

Joseph Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) (quoting a letter from Lawrence J. McDonnell to Joseph L.
Sax (Feb. 2, 1989)). Sax continues, "[t]he protection of the Constitution is afforded to
'private property,' and there is only one such category. Nowhere in the decisions of the
Supreme Court is there any hint that water rights are a constitutionally favored form of
property." Id. at 261. In fact, Sax argues that water rights have less protection than most
other property rights because they are subject to prior public claims such as the navigation
servitude and the public trust, are limited to beneficial and non-wasteful uses, and are
granted by permit. See id. at 260.
104 See Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82.(1937).
103
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subject to controls and conditions imposed by both the district and
the Bureau, unlike an individual irrigator who holds water rights in
his own name and diverts water for his own use.
1.

Irrigatoras Beneficial Owner of Project Water

The question of who really owns reclamation project water the irrigator or the federal government - was first addressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court sixty years ago in Ickes v. Fox. 5 That
case involved a dispute between the Bureau of Reclamation and
irrigators on the Yakima Project in Washington. The Bureau for
decades had delivered 4.84 acre-feet of water per acre of project
land, in exchange for an obligation of the irrigator to repay project
construction charges of $52 per acre. 10 6 An act of Congress prevented any increase in that repayment obligation without the irrigators' consent. 10 7 But the Bureau, in an effort to finance a new
reservoir, issued an order limiting project irrigators to three acrefeet per acre unless they agreed to pay an additional charge.10 8 The
irrigators sued Interior Secretary Ickes to enjoin enforcement of
the order. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the
suit should be dismissed because the United States, possessing sovereign immunity, was an indispensable party to the action.10 9
The Court found that the United States was not an indispensable
party because it was not the beneficial owner of project water
rights:
Although the government diverted, stored, and distributed
the water, the contention of [Ickes] that thereby ownership
of the water or water rights became vested in the United
States is not well founded. Appropriation was made not for
the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act,
for the use of the landowners; and by the terms of the law
and of the contract already referred to, the water rights
became the property of the landowners, wholly distinct from
the property right of the government in the irrigation
works. 110
105 Id.
106 See id. at 90-91.
107See id.
108 See id. at 92.
109See id. at 96.

110 Id. at 94-95. The Court found that the government was "simply a carrier and distributor of the water." Id.
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The irrigators' suit was thus allowed to proceed, and the Secretary
was enjoined from enforcing his order.111
The Court used similar language, under somewhat similar circumstances, in its 1983 decision in Nevada v. United States."' That
case involved the federal government's 1973 assertion of reserved
rights in Carson-Truckee river waters on behalf of the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe. 113 These rights would have subordinated those
granted to Newlands Project irrigators under an earlier decree
known as Orr Ditch, and would have effectively reassigned water
from the irrigators to the Tribe. The United States had represented
both the Tribe and the irrigators in the Orr Ditch adjudication, but
it had not sought water to protect the tribal fishery in Pyramid
Lake.' 1 4 In Nevada v. United States, the irrigators argued that res
judicata prevented the federal government from raising the new
claim.' 15
In its opening brief to the Supreme Court, the federal government made the mistake of characterizing its action as simply "a
reallocation of the water decreed in Orr Ditch to a single party the United States - from reclamation uses to a Reservation use
with an earlier priority.""1 6 The Supreme Court unanimously
rejected that argument based on its earlier cases,1 17 and declared
that the federal government could not simply reallocate water once
it had been applied to beneficial use:
[T]he Government is completely mistaken if it believes that
the water rights confirmed to it by the Orr Ditch decree in
1944 for use in irrigating lands within the Newlands Reclamation Project were like so many bushels of wheat, to be
bartered, sold, or shifted about as the Government might
see fit. Once these lands were acquired by settlers in the
Project, the Government's "ownership" of the water rights
was at most nominal; the beneficial interest in the rights
confirmed to the Government resided in the owners of the
land within the Project to which these water rights became
111 See Fox v. Ickes, 137 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 792 (1943).
112 463 U.S. 110 (1983).

115

118.
See id.at 117-19.
See id.at 119.

116

Id. at 121 (quoting Brief for United States at 21).

113See id.at
114

The Court quoted extensively from Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937), as well as
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), an interstate allocation case involving the
Platte River.
117
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appurtenant upon the application of Project water to the
land.'1 8
While Nevada v. United States confirmed that irrigators are the
beneficial owners of project water rights, it did not free these irrigators of federally-imposed controls on their use of project water.
In a later case involving the Newlands Project, 119 the Ninth Circuit
upheld two provisions of a 1973 judicial decree 120 which required
project water users to have valid water rights and to comply with
federal "Operating Criteria and Procedures" governing water
use.' 2 ' The 1973 decree provided for Interior Department review
of whether project water use met these federal requirements. The
Ninth Circuit found that the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v.
United States did not affect the validity of the two provisions:
"[W]hether the farmers or the government own the water rights,
with the 1973 decree in order
users of the water rights must comply
1' 22
water.'
receive
to continue to
2.

The Relationship Between the Irrigatorand the District or
Other Intermediary

In the earliest days of the reclamation program, the federal government worked directly with individual irrigators, who entered
into contracts in the form of water right applications. 123 But in
1922, Congress authorized the Bureau to contract with districts
rather than individual users, and, in the Omnibus Adjustment Act
of 1926,124 required that all future contracts be made only with irrigation districts. 25 Thus, users now receive reclamation project
water through an intermediary, which may be an irrigation district,
a conservancy district, a water user's association, or some other
form of organization. 26
The rights of most project irrigators are thus defined by their
relationship with a district.' 27 Although the issue of irrigators'
118 Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 126.
119 Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1989).
120 Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
121 See Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians, 878 F.2d at*1216.
122 Id. at 1217.
123 See Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 847.
124 Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, 44 Stat. 636 (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
125 See 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1994); Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 847.
126 See Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 834-35.
127 "Except where the individual irrigators have confirmed project rights, contracts with
irrigators, district bylaws, and state law determine how the district's directors must divide
the project supply." Id. at 849. Some individual irrigators do have their own confirmed
water rights in projects such as the Columbia Basin Project, where Congress specifically
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rights within irrigation districts and other organizations is exceedingly complex and beyond the scope of this Article, it should be
noted that irrigators' rights within an organization vary according
to state, type of organization, and the articles and by-laws of the
1 28
organization itself.
The difficulty of defining the rights of individual irrigators with
respect to a district or other intermediary can be illustrated by
comparing two conflicting judicial decisions. In Truckee-Carson
1 29
Irrigation District v. Secretary of the Department of the Interior,
the irrigation district claimed that the Interior Department had
taken the district's property rights to receive Newlands Project
water without due process of law. 130 The Ninth Circuit rejected
this claim and found that the district had no property rights in the
project water. The court held that although landowners within the
district have property rights to receive project water, the district
itself only has rights to manage the water. 131 The court did not
explain wheth6r its decision was based on state or federal law,
although the holding appears to be consistent with Nevada v.
United States132 and the federal cases cited therein.
A second case, Nelson v. Belle Fourche Irrigation District,33
involved a suit by an irrigator who alleged that the district had
wrongfully deprived him of property by failing to deliver the full
amount of project water owed from 1990 to 1992.'13 The federal
district court rejected the irrigator's claim, based on its finding that
South Dakota law vests property rights in project water in the district itself, not the irrigator.1 35 The court read section 8 of the Rec-

provided for contracts with individual irrigators, and in older projects where individual
irrigators have been given equitable rights to water by the courts or government agencies.
See id. at 847-48.
128 See Thompson, supra note 17, at 1. See also generally Jeffrey C. Fereday, Ownership
of Water Rights in Irrigation Water Delivery Organizations: An Outline of the Major
Issues (June 1983) (discussing the three basic water delivery organizations in the west:
mutual ditch corporations, commercial or "carrier" ditch corporations, and irrigation districts) (tinpublished paper presented at a conference at the Natural Resource Law Center
in Boulder, Colorado, on file with author).
129 742 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
130 See id. at 530.
131 See id. at 530-31.
132 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
133 845 F. Supp. 1361 (D.S.D. 1994).
134 See id. at 1363.
135 See id. at 1366.
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providing for the application
lamation Act of 1902136 as explicitly
1 37
matter.
the
deciding
in
of state law
The Nelson court's interpretation of section 8 seems dubious.
Since Congress intended land owners to be the beneficiaries of the
reclamation program, and since districts are only intermediaries in
that program, a state law purporting to vest property rights in the
district might be inconsistent with congressional intent and there1 38
fore invalid notwithstanding section 8's preference for state law.
However, regardless of whether the district or the irrigator is considered the beneficial owner, it seems clear that the irrigator's
actual use of39project water is subject to certain terms specified by
the district.'
C . State and Federal Laws Limiting IrrigatorRights
Water rights are property, and thus cannot be "taken" without
due process of law and just compensation.14 0 However, governments do have the power to regulate the use of private property, so
long as their actions- do not rise to the level of a taking.1 4 1 Thus,
water rights - like other forms of private property - are subject
to regulation by state and federal governments.
In exercising their police powers, the western states have long
regulated the appropriation and distribution of waters within their
boundaries. 142 As one commentator noted, "'[t]he idea that the
individual has a vested right to enjoy the use of running water without public regulation or control is subversive of the sovereignty of
the State. The state cannot divest itself of, or surrender, grant, or
bargain away this authority." 1 43 Under the public trust doctrine,
13643 U.S.C. § 383 (1994).

See Nelson, 845 F. Supp. at 1365.
See United States v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 694 F.2d 1171,
1176-77 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983); Ickes v.
Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95 (1937). Moreover, two Ninth Circuit decisions regarding the Newlands
Project have emphasized that project water rights must be evaluated at the parcel or landowner level, not at the district level. See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.,
878 F.2d 1217, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 983
F.2d 1487, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992).
139 See Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 846-49.
140 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
141 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978)
(discussing factors used to determine whether an action constitutes a taking under the
Constitution).
142 See HUTCHINS, supra note 25, at 7.
143 Id. (quoting Bergman v. Kearney, 241 F. 884, 893 (D. Nev. 1917)).
137

138
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states have an affirmative responsibility to retain and exercise control over public resources, including water resources.144
While Joseph Sax has acknowledged that water rights are private
property, he maintains that water rights are actually less constitutionally protected than other property rights for the following
reasons:
(a) because their exercise may intrude on a public common,
[water rights] are subject to several original public prior
claims, such as the navigation servitude and the public trust,
and to laws protecting commons, such as water pollution
laws; (b) their original definition, limited to beneficial and
non-wasteful uses, imposes limits beyond those that constrain most property rights; [and] (c) insofar as water rights
(unlike most other property rights) are granted by permit,
they are subject to constraints articulated in the permits. 4 '
Relying primarily on Supreme Court cases, and noting that state
courts have generally followed the same principles, 46 Sax concluded that states have considerable authority to regulate water use
and even to change the terms of use under long-established water
rights.1 47 But how far the state and federal governments may go
before a regulation becomes a "taking" is the subject of vigorous
debate. 48
While state-law limitations apply to all water rights, project
water rights are subject to an unusual degree of federal control.
The most familiar federal directives affecting project water use are
the general reclamation laws, particularly the acreage limitations
and related provisions. 149 A user who fails to comply with these
laws may have no right to receive project water.' 50 Other applicable federal directives include acts of Congress relating to a specific
144 See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983). The
public trust doctrine requires that states, among other things, serve as trustees of the waterways and submerged land within their borders for the benefit of the public. See id. For the
seminal discussion of the public trust doctrine, see Joseph Sax, The Public.TrustDoctrinein
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.. REv. 471 (1970).
145 Sax, supra note 103, at 260.
146 See id. at 259-60 n.4.
147 See id. at 262-67.
148 See generally WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 43-89 (Kathleen
Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995) (containing articles on water rights takings
by James S. Burling, Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., and Joseph L. Sax).
149 Important laws affecting project water include the substantive portions of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, 43 U.S.C. §§ 423-423g (1994), and § 5 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1994) (imposing the 160-acre limitation).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1143 (9th Cir. 1976);
Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 790, 793 (1993).
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project, whether these statutes authorize a new project 51 or change
the law relating to an existing project. 152 Also relevant to project
water rights are Interior Department regulations relating to a particular project 15 3 or to all projects,15 4 and federal environmental
1 5
laws.
D. ContractualLimits on Rights to Project Water
Perhaps the most important limitation on rights to use project
water is that they are largely defined by reclamation contracts. As
explained in Part VI below, water users' contract rights for project
water may be far more limited than the users have come to expect.
In Fox v. Ickes' 56 and United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir
Co., 57 the courts held that the amount Of water to which project
irrigators are entitled is defined not by their contracts, but by their
beneficial use of water.' 5 8 Although the provisions of the irrigators' contracts seemed to limit water use to three acre-feet of water
for each acre of land to be irrigated, 59 in practice, the irrigators
received substantially more water for many years.' 6° Despite testimony that the irrigators could have grown crops successfully with
less water, the courts found that the historic water use was "beneficial.'' 6 In making such findings, both courts placed more emphasis on the provision of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which states
151 See, e.g., Washoe Project Act, ch. 809, 70 Stat. 775 (1956) (repealed by Pub. L. No.
101z618, 104 Stat. 3307 (1990)); see also, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Washoe Project Act).
152 See, e.g., Central Valley Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3401, 106 Stat.
4706 (1992); see also, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting
Central Valley Project Improvement Act).
153 See, e.g., Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Secretary of the Dep't of the Interior, 742
F.2d 527, 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding Interior Department regulations on the Newlands Project).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487,
490 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (upholding Interior Department regulations addressed to all land
subject to reclamation law acreage limitations).
155 See, e.g., Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717 (E.D.
Cal. 1993), affid sub nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.). As the district
court stated, "Even assuming, arguendo, that the [irrigators] hold water rights based on
statutes which are broader than their contractual rights, they are not exempt from compliance with environmental laws." Id. at 732 (citing United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation
Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992)). See also Melissa K. Estes, The Effect of the
Federal Endangered Species Act on State Water Rights, 22 ENVTL. L. 1027 (1992).
156 137 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
157 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983).
158 See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d at 855; Fox, 137 F.2d at 33.
159 See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d at 857.
160 See id.; Fox, 137 F.2d at 31.
161 See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d at 856-57; Fox, 137 F.2d at 34-35.
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that beneficial use shall be "the basis, the measure, and the limit of
water] rights,' 1 62 than on the provisions of the
the [project
63
contracts.'

Moreover, in Fox v. Ickes, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit implied that project water rights are not limited by the provisions of reclamation contracts, and noted that "the water-rights
here are not based upon the construction or enforcement of contracts with the government."'" However, the court appears to
have misconstrued the Supreme Court's remand decision of Ickes
v. Fox. 165 In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court
clearly believed it was upholding the contracts by awarding the irribeneficial use
gators the full amount of their "beneficial use," since
66
language was included in the original contract.'
More recently, however, courts within the Ninth Circuit have
held that the reclamation contracts themselves, rather than beneficial use, define project water rights. In ascertaining the vested
rights of project water users, courts have looked to the users' contracts, even where their historic water use went beyond the terms
of those contracs. 67 In Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands
Water District,1 68 the court specifically rejected an argument, based
on the Supreme Court opinion in Ickes v. Fox, that irrigators' water
Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d at 853 (quoting Reclamation Act of 1902, ch.
8,
32
Stat. 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994)); Fox, 137 F.2d at 33 (same).
1093, §
163 See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d at 853-55; Fox, 137 F.2d at 33.
164 Fox, 137 F.2d at 30, 35.
165300 U.S. 82 (1937).
166 After noting that the irrigators had performed all their duties under the reclamation
contracts, the Supreme Court stated:
[B]y the express terms of the contract made between the government and the
Water Users Association on behalf of [irrigators], the determination of the
[S]ecretary as to the number of acres capable of irrigation was "to be based
upon and measured and limited by the beneficial use of water." [Interior
Department officials], accordingly, had decided that 4.84 acre feet of water
per annum per acre was necessary to the beneficial and successful irrigation of
respondents' lands.
Id. at 94.
167 See Peterson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 811-12 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding no contract right to deliver subsidized water to leased lands, despite federal
acquiescence to the practice); see also United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649
F.2d 1286, 1311 n.22 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating in dicta that the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District's water rights were defined in the contract with the federal government and that
the district would be afforded traditional contract remedies for breach), affd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
168 849 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affd sub nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d
677 (9th Cir. 1995).
162 Alpine
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rights are greater than their contract rights. 169 The court recognized that while Ickes v. Fox gave irrigators certain property rights
in project water,
Ickes does not stand for the proposition that these property
rights require the government to continue to deliver water
in contravention of the. water delivery contract, which
defines the extent of the water right. The disputed contract
grants specified water rights. The government is prohibited
from breaching the terms of the contract. 7 °
The court found that the contracts in question did not obligate the
government to continue delivering the amounts of water which irrigators had traditionally received.1 71 The following section more
fully explores the extent of irrigators' contract rights in project
water.
VI.

THE WATER USER'S RIGHTS TO PROJECT WATER,

PART Two: CONTRACT RIGHTS
Individual water users generally do not have their own contracts
with the federal government. Instead, they receive water through a
district or other organization which in turn has. a reclamation contract with the federal government.1 72 However, as third party benusers can sue to protect their
eficiaries of such contracts, water
1 73
rights to receive project water.
Users' rights vary widely due to differences in reclamation contracts. While most can generally be classified as either repayment
contracts or water service contracts, 74 their terms vary significantly
by project and by district. Several important terms define users'
rights to receive and use project water, including terms specifying
169 See id. at 731-32. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly address the issue of
whether the contract defines the water rights, but it did rely almost exclusively on the
irrigators' contracts in determining their rights. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,
682-87 (9th Cir. 1995).
170 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, 849 F. Supp. at 731.
171 See id. at 732.
172

District rights and responsibilities regarding project water are discussed in Part VII,

infra.
173 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 816-17 (9th Cir.
1990). The plaintiffs were district irrigators who were third-party beneficiaries of a contract between the district and the government. See id. at 816. The irrigators sued the district in state court, but the district joined the United States as a party and the case was
removed to federal court. See id. at 817; cf Peterson v. United States Dep't of the Interior,
899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990) (water users and districts suing the Interior Department
directly).
174 See supra Part III.A.
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the quantity of water to be delivered,'175 the allocation of water during shortages, 176 the lands and total acreage on which the water
may be used,'" and the purposes for which the water may be

used. 178 While terms such as these vary among contracts, other
terms - including an important provision relieving the government of liability for failure to deliver water for any 79reason 1
appear in reclamation contracts with high consistency.
A.

Contract Rights as Property Rights

Reclamation contracts create certain property rights which the
United States Constitution protects from government impairment.180 These rights may be permanent, even if the underlying
" ' the discontract is not. In Madera IrrigationDistrict v. Hancock,18

trict was found to have a vested property right in a permanent supply of project water,182even though its forty-year water service
contract had expired.
In Madera and several other cases, districts and irrigators have
argued that federal actions deprived them of property rights under

175 Some contracts specifically address the quantity of water to be delivered; others do
not. Where a contract provides for the delivery of stored water, it may allocate a percentage of the storage space in a particular reservoir to the contracting district. These are
called "spaceholder" contracts. See, e.g. Island Irrigation Company Reclamation Contract
§ 7, Minidoka and Palisades Projects, Idaho, Contract No. 14-06-W-29 (1952) (allocating
.3917% of the reservoir's capacity to the irrigation district) (on file with author).
176 See, e.g., Roza Irrigation District Reclamation Contract § 15, Yakima Project, Washington, Contract No. 14-06-W-69 (1953) (establishing a pro-rata water distribution in times
of shortage) (on file with author).
177 See, e.g., North Unit Irrigation District Reclamation Contract § 11, Deschutes Project, Oregon, Contract No. 14-06-W-71 (1954) (setting forth certain coverage areas) (on file
with author).
178See, e.g., Tialatin Valley Irrigation District Reclamation Contract § 10(b), Tualatin
Project, Oregon, Contract No. 14-06-100-6956 (1971) (as amended by Contract No. 14-06100-6956A (1976)) (limiting water for irrigation purposes only, excluding delivery to parcels of land smaller than 2 acres, and prohibiting domestic or municipal uses without prior
approval) (on file with author).
179Repayment contracts typically have some version of the "United States not liable"
clause. See, e.g., Island Irrigation Company contract, supra note 175, § 18; Roza Irrigation
District contract, supra note 176, § 32; North Unit Irrigation District contract, supra note
177, § 14(f); Tualatin Valley Irrigation District contract, supra note 178, § 22. The irrigator
plaintiffs in O'Neill v. United States characterized the clause as a standard provision of
water service contracts. See 50 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 1995).
180 See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir. 1993); Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist. 899 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1990).
181985 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1993).
182See id. at 1401-02. The Ninth Circuit based this finding on the language of the water
service contract itself. See id.
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reclamation contracts. 183 In addressing such claims, the Ninth Circuit has stated that in order to demonstrate a wrongful taking or
impairment, a district or irrigator must first establish that it has a
cognizable property right arising out of a federal contract, and then
184
show a substantial impairment of that right by the government.
Only the Madera district was able to establish a clear property
right, 85 and in every case the government ultimately prevailed. 8 6
Although contract rights may be property rights, water users'
expectations do not rise to the level of property rights unless those
expectations are protected in the contract itself. The Ninth Circuit
made this point clear in Peterson v. United States Department of the
Interior,187 in response to a water district argument that a provision
of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 (RRA)18 8 would unlawfully prevent deliveries of subsidized water to large tracts of leased
land. 189 The plaintiffs argued that they had vested property rights
to continue such deliveries because of their "reasonable investment-backed expectations" based on pre-RRA statutes, the statements and conduct of government officials during the negotiation
and drafting of the contracts, and the absence of contract provisions forbidding the deliveries. 9 ° The court rejected that argument, stating that the plaintiffs had offered "no authority for the
proposition that a constitutionally protected property interest can
be spun out of the yarn of investment-backed expectations."' 1 91
183 See, e.g., id. at 1400-01; Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 821; Peterson v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 807 (9th Cir. 1990); Barcellos & Wolfsen, 849 F.
Supp. 717, 731 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affd sub nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th
Cir. 1995).
184See Madera Irrigation Dist., 985 F.2d at 1401; Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 821.
185 See Madera Irrigation Dist., 985 F.2d at 1401-02. The court found, based on provisions of 1939 and 1951 reclamation contracts, that the district had a right to a permanent
supply of water. See id. The court also held, however, that the United States had not
wrongfully impaired that right by adding payment and environmental conditions in the
district's new water'service contract. See id. at 1402-06.
186 See id. at 1406; Barcellos & Wolfsen, 899 F.2d at 825-26; Peterson,899 F.2d at 813-14;
Barcellos & Wolfsen, 849 F.Supp. at 734.
187 899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990).
188 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa-390zz-1 (1994).
189 See Peterson,899 F.2d at 807. Specifically, the district attacked section 203(b) of the
RRA, the so-called "hammer clause," which requires districts to either amend their contracts to conform to the provisions of the RRA or pay full cost for any water delivered to
tracts larger than 160 acres. See id. at 806 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b)).
190See id. at 812-13.
191 Id. at 813. The court stated that the districts erred in relying on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984):
Ruckelshaus is authority for the proposition that once a constitutionally protected property interest is established, then a reasonable investment-backed
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Other recent cases in the Ninth Circuit have reinforced this
conclusion.192
Irrigators have also failed to establish a property right sufficient
to maintain their existing water use even where Interior Department regulations, policies, and practices have created a reasonable
expectation that the use could continue. Courts have rejected
water users' claims of property rights for several reasons. First, the
courts have recognized that the United States government must
retain the power to change its policies to reflect the public interest.193 In several recent cases involving reclamation contract disputes, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the federal government
retains its sovereign power "unless surrendered in unmistakable
terms.' 1 94 Second, courts have found irrigators' property rights
limited by contract provisions that excuse the government for failing to deliver water.' 95 Third, especially where past Interior
Department action (or inaction) was contrary to the letter and
expectation is one of several factors to be taken into account "when determining whether a governmental action has gone beyond 'regulation' and effects a
'taking."' Whether a "taking" has occurred is the second step of the inquiry.
Here, we do not reach that step because the Water Districts have failed to
survive the first step, which is establishing that a property right exists. Thus,
the Water Districts' reliance on Ruckelshaus is misplaced, leaving them with
no support for the curious proposition that investment-backed expectations
can give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
192 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Madera IrrigationDistrict v. Hancock:
Reasonable expectations arising out of past policy but without a basis in cognizable property rights may be honored by prudent politicians, because to do
otherwise might be unfair, or because volatility in government policy will
reduce its effectiveness in inducing long term changes in behavior. But violation of such expectations cannot give rise to a Fifth Amendment [takings]
claim.
985 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Peterson, 899 F.2d at 812-13); see also Barcellos
& Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
government regulations created reasonable expectations that landowners would receive
subsidized water for an. extended period of time, but that the application of the statute
requiring them to pay full cost rather than subsidized rate did not violate any constitutionally protectable expectations); Central Ariz. Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Lujan, 764 F.
Supp. 582, 589 (D. Ariz. 1991) (stating that the plaintiffs' mere expectations that they
would receive the project water "do not rise to the level of vested rights").
193 See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Madera Irrigation Dist., 985 F.2d at 1406; Peterson, 899 F.2d at 808, 812.
194 O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686 (quoting Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)); see also Madera Irrigation Dist., 985 F.2d at 1401,
1406 (same); Peterson, 899 F.2d at 808, 812 (same).
195 See Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 763 F.2d
1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 1985); Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp.
717, 731-32 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.
1995).
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spirit of the reclamation laws, courts have refused either to recognize a property right in irrigators based on that action,19 6 or to find
that Interior is estopped from adopting a new position.1 97
B.

Contract-based Limits on Users' Rights to Project Water

Because users' rights to project water arise from reclamation
contracts, the contracts necessarily limit those rights. This point is

fundamental, but has often been contested by irrigators who seek
to continue existing uses not fully protected by a contract. The
cases raise several corollary points.
First, users without contracts have no right to receive project
water, even if they have actually applied project water to a beneficial use. In United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.,198 irrigators argued that certain "transferee" lands lacking contracts were

nonetheless entitled to continue receiving project water, 199 based
on the holding of an earlier case involving the same parties which
implied that project water rights were defined by actual beneficial
use, not contractual limits. 20 0 The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected
that argument:
The Alpine court's discussion of the beneficial use
requirement occurs only in the context of determining how
much water duty is appropriate for lands already entitled to
receive Project water. Section 8 of the Act strictly limits the
beneficial use concept to properties that are entitled to
receive Project water. Section 8 explains that beneficial use
is the measure of the "right to the use of water acquired
under the provisions of this Act."
The critical defect with the transferee properties involved
in this case, however, is that they generally have no right to
196 See Peterson, 899 F.2d at 810-11. The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509, 540-42 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on

other grounds sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980). In Imperial Irrigation Dis-

trict, irrigators claimed they had a right to continue irrigating lands despite statutory acreage limitations, based largely on the Interior Department's longstanding refusal to enforce
those limitations. See id. at 536. The court had little trouble rejecting that argument:
"Inaction based on previous inaction cannot be elevated into an administrative determination to which the courts should defer." Id. at 540.
197 See Bostwick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 900 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1990):
198 878 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1989).
199 See id. at 1221. As the court explained, "[slome Project properties are presently
under irrigation although they are not entitled to receive Project water by contract or certificate. Indeed, most of the properties in this case to which appellees seek to transfer
water rights are examples of these improperly irrigated properties." Id.
200 See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 855-56 (9th Cir.
1983).
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receive Project water. The landowners do not hold contracts or certificates entitling their properties to be irrigated.
The beneficial use discussion, central to the Alpine decision,

is therefore of no consequence to the presumed right of
transferee properties to receive transferred water rights.2" 1
Second, users must comply with contract terms or risk losing
their rights to receive project water. In one case, irrigators who
failed to dispose of their excess lands, as they had agreed to do,
were found to have no right to continue receiving project water on
those lands.20 2 In another case, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District
2 °3 the Ninth Circuit
v. Secretary of the Department of the Interior,
upheld the cancellation of the water district's contract because the
district failed to observe federal regulations governing water use on
the Newlands Project.20 4 The court held that the district had
openly violated the contract's operating criteria, and that the contract gave the Secretary the right to terminate the contract upon a
violation of these regulations.20 5 While it had the power to terminate its contract with the district,the Secretary could not necessarily deny water to TCID's irrigators, who were the actual beneficial
owners of the Newlands Project water rights.20 6
201 Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d at 1228-29 (citations omitted). The Ninth
Circuit reaffirmed this holding in United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 983 F.2d
1487 (9th Cir. 1992).
202 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir.
1990). The contract between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Westlands Water District
required any owner of excess lands, as a condition precedent to receiving project water on
those lands, to agree to dispose of those lands within ten years. See id. at 816. If the owner
failed to do so, the contract gave the Department of Interior the power to sell them. See id.
The irrigators argued that they had fulfilled their contract obligations merely by agreeingto
sell those lands, and that they could continue to receive project water even though they
had not actually sold them. See id. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the landowners breached the contract, thus absolving the Department of Interior of its duty to supply
water. See id. at 822.
203 742 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
204 See id. at 532.
205 See id. The Ninth Circuit disposed of the issue tersely:
TCID readily admits that it violated the operating criteria by diverting more
water than the criteria permitted. The 1926 contract explicitly gave the Secretary the right to terminate the contract if TCID violated regulations concerning the operation of the Newlands Project. It did, and the Secretary exercised
his right to terminate. That was the agreement and we see no reason why
TCD should not be required to abide by it.
742 F.2d at 532.
206 See id. at 530-31. The Ninth Circuit rejected the district's claim that the contract's
operating criteria deprived the district of property without due process on the ground that
project water rights were held by irrigators rather than the district, and thus, only the irrigators could make a due process claim. See id. The Court had previously determined that
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Perhaps the most important contractual limitation on irrigators'
rights to receive project water, however, is found within the contracts. As noted above, most reclamation contracts contain a provision that excuses the government from liability for water
shortage arising from any cause.2 °7 The Westlands Water District's
1963 reclamation contract contains such a clause,208 which has been
the subject of litigation at least twice. In the first case, Westlands
Water District v. United States Department of the Interior, °9 the
court relied on the clause to uphold the Bureau's apportionment of
scarce water supplies. among various irrigation users in the drought
year of 1992.210

The second case, Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water
2 1 1 may have more far-reaching implications. In that case,
District,
the Westlands Water District challenged the Department of Interior's 1993 decision to halve the district's normal allocation of
900,000 acre-feet of water from the Central Valley Project.2t 2 The

United States acknowledged its contractual duty to deliver 900,000
acre-feet but contended that it could not deliver Westlands's full
supply because the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 213 and the 1992
Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) 214 required that
Newlands Project water rights were beneficially owned by the irrigators. See Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983).
207 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
208 See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 682-83 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). Article 11 of the
Westlands contract, entitled "United States Not Liable for Water Shortage," provides in
relevant part:
There may occur at times during any year a shortage in the quantity of water
available for furnishing to the district through and by means of the Project,
but in no event shall any liability accrue against the United States or any of its
officers, agents, or employees for any damage, direct or indirect, arising from
a shortage on account of errors in operation, drought or any other causes ....
Id. at 682 n.2. The contract also provides that the district's sole remedy in the event of a
shortage is an adjustment to its payment obligation. See id. at 683 n.2.
209 805 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Cal. 1992), affd sub nom. Westlands Water Dist. v.
Firebaugh Canal Co., 10 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1993).
210 See id. at 1512-13. In February 1992, the Bureau ordered that Westlands would
receive only one-fourth of its normal water supply from the Central Valley Project that
year. See id. at 1513. The court characterized the Bureau's actions as "honoring its legal
commitments to holders of senior water rights," although the Bureau's February
announcement also noted that project water distributions might vary. during the summer
"to address fishery and other priorities." Id.
211849 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affd sub nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d
677 (9th Cir. 1995).
212 See id. at 721.

213 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
214 Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C., 25 U.S.C, and 43 U.S.C (1994)).
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water be made available for environmental uses.215 The government argued that it need not deliver a full supply because of the
shortage clause in the district's reclamation contract.216 The district court found that the shortage clause was valid and that the
Bureau's compliance with the congressional mandate to use Central Valley Project water for environmental purposes had created a
legitimate shortage under the terms of the Westlands contract.217

As a result, the Bureau was justified in delivering water for environmental purposes, rather than irrigation.21 8
In O'Neill v. United States, 219 the Ninth Circuit affirmed Barcellos & Wolfsen and held that the reclamation contract clauses

absolving the United States of liability for a shortage allowed the
government to reallocate water from irrigation to environmental
uses if done in the course of carrying out mandatory duties under
federal law. 220 Two factors temper this rather dramatic holding.

First, the CVPIA contained unusually strong requirements to pro-

vide water for environmental purposes.22 ' The result might have
been different if the government did not have a clear statutory duty
to deliver water for those purposes,222 although the district court in
Barcellos & Wolfsen also upheld the Bureau's actions under the

less specific requirements of the ESA.223 Second, the government

does not have unlimited discretion to invoke the shortage clause
See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc., 849 F. Supp. at 721.
See id. at 721-22.
217 See id. at 725. The court did not reach the issue of whether the government's actions
under the ESA and the CVPIA were legal. This issue was litigated in a separate suit, in
which Westlands sought to enjoin implementation of the environmental provisions of the
CVPIA. See Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1993),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Westlands Water Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 43 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 1994). Westlands argued that implementation would violate
§ 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370d (1994). See
Westlands Water Dist., 43 F.3d at 459. The district court granted a preliminary injunction.
See id. The Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding that the CVPIA had directed the
Department of Interior to take immediate action without the need for NEPA compliance.
See id. at 460-62.
218 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc., 849 F. Supp. at 717.
219 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
220 See id. at 689.
221 See Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706, 4714-15 (1990) (describing the obligations of
the Interior Secretary to operate the Central Valley Project to protect and restore fish and
wildlife habitats).
222 The district court noted that the "Federal Defendants have not suggested that the
Bureau's allocation decisions were based on its voluntary compliance with federal or state
law, or that a shortage may be created under the contract by acts not required by law."
Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc., 849 F. Supp. at 724 n.11.
223 See id. at 733.
215

216

Reclamation Project Water

1997]

based on water needs for other purposes.2 24 Water users may
always attack the government's action as unlawful or unreasonable
under the contract.225
In any litigation against the government regarding contract interpretation, water users are somewhat disadvantaged. The Ninth
Circuit, at least, has consistently given the United States the benefit of the doubt: "[i]n a case where the government is charged by
private individuals with breaching its own obligations in violation
of the Constitution, '[a]ny ambiguity in the contract must operate
against the adventurer and in favor ot the public.' 2 26 On more
than one occasion, the Ninth Circuit has questioned the basic fairness of the government's actions.2 27 But the Ninth Circuit has
made it clear, in matters of reclamation contracts, that the United
States retains its sovereign
authority "unless surrendered in unmis22 8
takable terms.
VII.

DISTRICT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS REGARDING
PROJECT WATER

For the past seventy years, the Bureau has contracted with organizations, typically irrigation districts, rather than individuals to
deliver project water.229 The district functions as a manager and
middleman, distributing project water to individual users within the
district and collecting money from those users to pay the United
States as required by the district's repayment or water service contract. 230 But a contracting district is not simply a passive conduit
224 See id. at 723-24.
225 See id. at 724.

226 Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted). On the other hand, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that ambiguities
should be interpreted in a way that favors the non-drafting party. See Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 790, 799 (1993). The court ruled for the district and

against the United States in a case involving reporting requirements under the Reclamation Reform Act. See id. at 793, 796.
227 See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1402-04 (9th Cir. 1993);
Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc., 899 F.2d at 826 (Fernandez, J.,dissenting).

228 O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also
Madera Irrigation Dist., 985 F.2d at 1401, 1406 (recognizing the need to interpret the stat-

ute to avoid "foreclosing the exercise of sovereign authority"); Peterson v. United States
Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that Congress has

the right to alter contracts unless it clearly surrenders this authority).
229 See Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 834-35.
230 Professor Sax explains that:

The function of the district is to act as an intermediary between the United
States and the ultimate user, contracting with individuals for allotments from
the project, administering the distribution of water, and collecting taxes and
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for water and money; it also has certain rights and responsibilities
with respect to project water.
A.

The District's Rights as Manager and Middleman

Bureau contracts give districts certain property rights protected
by the Constitution. 231 As explained in the previous Part, courts
have found these rights to be defined by contract terms and circumscribed by the federal government's retention of sovereign

authority. A district's contract rights may include the right to manage the project from which it receives water.232
The district's interests in project water, however, depend on
several factors not defined in its reclamation contract. First, a district
may hold project water rights in its own name. Project water rights
are generally held in the name of the United States, but not
always.233 Where the district itself holds title, it may assume some
of the authorities and duties which the United States normally
would bear by virtue of being the nominal owner of project water
rights. 234 Even where the United States holds the water rights,
however, the district has an equitable interest in them.235
Second, a district's interests in project water depend on that district's organizational form. Many different kinds of entities hold
reclamation contracts, including districts, mutual ditch and canal
user fees to pay annual maintenance expenses as well as the capital repayment due to the United States.
JOSEPH L. SAX. WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 119-20 (1968).

231 See Madera IrrigationDist., 985 F.2d at 1401.
232 See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Secretary of the Dep't of the Interior, 742 F.2d
527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, which had held
that the district's management rights were limited by the terms of its contract and by
Bureau regulations governing project water use. See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v.
Secretary of the Dep't of the Interior, No. R-74-34 BRT, slip op. at 16-18 (D. Nev. Aug. 18,
1983) (on file with author).
233 See Stream Adjudications Opinion, supra note 37, at 25 n.4.
234 These duties include, among other things, the responsibility to take actions needed to
protect project water supplies. See id. at 27-30.
235 See Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 835. In the general stream adjudication for the
Yakima Basin in Washington, the court has held that the United States holds water rights
as "trustee" for the Yakima-Tieton Irrigation District. Washington Dep't of Ecology v.
Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct. Yakima County, Wash. Sept. 14,
1995) (Conditional Final Order Yakima-Tieton Irrigation District-i). In response to a
request from the federal government, the court has clarified that the "trust" language
imposes no fiduciary duties on the United States. Telephone Conversation with Jim Esget,
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Yakima, Wash. (Jan. 17, 1996). One commentator has stated
that where the Bureau holds legal title to project water rights, "[t]he district holds an equitable interest in the project, as defined by its contract, in trust for its irrigators, who in turn
have equitable shares of the district's interest." Roos-Collins, supra note 29, at 835.
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companies, and commercial water supply companies.236 These
entities differ in their ownership of water rights and their relationship to individual water users.237
Third, a district's interests in project water rights depend on the
law of the state in which the district is located. In most states, irrigation districts own the project water rights.238 In California, on
the other hand, landowners within the district who apply water 239
to
beneficial use are considered the actual water right owners.
Some states also view mutual ditch companies and commercial
water companies as owning water rights, in which individual users
retain a beneficial interest.240
Even though users always have a beneficial interest, the question
of whether a district "owns" project water rights is potentially very
important. If a district has an ownership interest in project water,
it may retain its entitlement to all of that water even though individual users lose their rights. The district could simply shift that
water to other qualified lands within the district, 241 or increase
deliveries to lands not receiving a complete supply. On the other
hand, if a district is essentially a carrier or manager with no beneficial interest in receiving project water, it may have no complaint if
the government reduces the district's water deliveries.
The United States Interior Solicitor recently took the position
that irrigation districts generally hold a very limited interest in reclamation project water:
Unlike the United States and individual water users, in the
typical case irrigation districts hold neither a legal nor beneficial interest in the water right. They have no property
interest in the water, nor have they in their own right
diverted the water to storage .... Moreover, the districts

236 According to the Bureau, the entities that hold reclamation contracts include, but are
not limited to, canal companies, conservancy districts, ditch companies, irrigation and
drainage districts, irrigation companies, irrigation districts, reclamation districts, service
districts, storage districts, water districts, and water users associations. See BUREAU EIS,
supra note 1, at G-3.
237 For a comparison of the ownership interests of irrigation districts, mutual ditch companies, and commercial water companies, see Fereday, supra note 128, at 13-24.
238 See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW 416 (1984).
239 See id.
240 See Fereday, supra note 128, at 13-24.
241 State law, federal law, and reclamation contracts limit the district's discretion in moving water to new lands. See Benson & Priestley, supra note 96, at 89-90.
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have not put the water to beneficial use and thus do not hold

an interest in the water right.242

The Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of district water right
ownership at least twice, with seemingly inconsistent results. In
Truckee-Carson IrrigationDistrictv. Secretary of the Department of
the Interior,243 the court found that the district's contract rights
were limited to project management, while the actual project water
rights were held by landowners within the district. 2 " Thus, the district could not claim a taking of private property resulting from a
reduction in project water deliveries.245
In United States v. Imperial Irrigation District,246 however, the
Ninth Circuit found that the district held title to project water
rights and that no individual landowner within the district had a
property interest entitling them to receive water.247 The court
therefore decided that while the acreage limitation provisions of
federal reclamation law might deprive some district lands of project water, the water supply of the district itself would not change,
and thus, the water redistribution would not impair the district's
rights. 248 The court decided that the water redistribution com249
ported with the requirement in the Boulder Canyon Project Act
that the Interior Secretary must satisfy "present perfected rights"
acquired under state law and also comported with California law
242 Regional Interior Solicitors Memo, supra note 21 at 10 (citing Truckee-Carson Irrigation District v. Secretary of the Interior, 742 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984)) (citation omitted).
The memorandum made these points in support of the position that the United States was
the proper party to file for irrigation water rights associated with the Klamath reclamation
project in a water rights adjudication. See id. at 1-2, 9-11.
243 742 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
244 See id. at 530.
245 See id. at 530-31. An earlier judicial decision had required the Interior Department
to change its operations at the Newlands Project to provide additional water to an Indian
tribe and its fishery in Pyramid Lake. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,
354 F. Supp. 252, 266-67 (D.D.C. 1973). That decision, and Interior Department regulations implementing it, had caused reductions in water deliveries to the district. See id. The
Ninth Circuit stated: "[tihe Tribe v. Morton decision, of course, reduced the amount of
water TCID was authorized to divert. But TCID had no water rights. Only the nature of
its managerial duty was affected. This does not amount to a taking of property without due
process." Truckee-Carson IrrigationDist., 742 F.2d at 531. Only the landowners were considered to have lost property and were able to claim a taking. See id.
246 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
247 See id. at 528-29. The court found that water rights are held in trust by a water
district for common public use. See id. at 529. Landowners do not own individual rights to
water, nor does such a right attach to their land. See id. The class of landowners as a
whole shares the right to beneficial use of the water. See id.
248 See id.
249 Ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-619b (1994)).
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regarding ownership of water rights by and within irrigation
districts.25 °
The two cases do not actually conflict because ImperialIrrigation
on a specific provision of the Boulder Canyon ProDistrictturned
ject Act. 251 Truckee-Carson IrrigationDistrict cited no authority to
support its holding on district water rights,25 2 but it seems consistent with Nevada v. United States 53 and Ickes v. Fox,254 and with
the appurtenancy requirement of section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act.2 55 The Truckee-Carson approach also leads to more uniform and predictable results, in that it bases a district's right to
receive project water on the provisions of the district's reclamation
contract, rather than on the nature of the contracting organization
or on varying state laws regarding water right ownership by districts. 6 But reclamation law and contracts by themselves may not
determine a district's ownership interests; state law may. also be a
factor.257
B.

DistrictResponsibilities Regarding Water Delivery

While irrigation districts have rights regarding project water,
they also have responsibilities to ensure that the water is used in
accordance with federal requirements. Clearly, a district must
25 8
comply with federal mandates applicable to the district itself.
See Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d at 527-29.
See id. at 528. The Imperial and Truckee-Carson cases are entirely consistent in one
respect: both upheld federal limitations on project water use. Imperial confirmed that the
excess lands restrictions of federal reclamation law apply to lands within the Boulder Canyon Project. See id. at 527-28. The Supreme Court reversed this holding in Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980), on the grounds that Congress did not intend to apply the
restrictions to that project. See Bryant, 447 U.S. at 368. Truckee-Carson upheld Interior
Department regulations on Newlands Project water use, issued pursuant to an earlier judicial decision requiring greater federal protection of ecological and tribal trust resources.
See Truckee-Carson IrrigationDist., 742 F.2d at 532.
252 See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 742 F.2d at 530-31.
253 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
254 300 U.S. 82 (1937); see also supra Part V.B.1 (setting forth cases that hold that landowners who use project water are the beneficial owners of that water).
255 Section 8 provides that "[t]he right to the use of water acquired under the provisions
of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated" 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994).
256 See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 742 F.2d at 530-31.
257 See, e.g., Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d at 528 (considering California law to
determine ownership of water rights).
258 See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 742 F.2d at 532, where the district violated a
federal regulation limiting the total volume of water the district could divert annually. The
Ninth Circuit upheld Interior's termination of the district's repayment contract, based on a
term of that contract authorizing termination for substantial violation of the contract. See
id.
250
251
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Courts have also stated that districts have the primary responsibility for ensuring that their individual users comply with federal reclamation law and for taking action against users in violation.
Unfortunately, courts have not convincingly articulated the legal
bases for these responsibilities, leaving some uncertainty as to the
extent of district duties and the consequences of failing to meet
them.
The most detailed statement of the source and nature of district
responsibilities appears in Peterson v. United States Department of
the Interior."9 In Peterson, several California districts argued that
they had a right to continue delivering water to leased tracts of any
size, despite section 203(b) of the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act
(RRA). 60 In reviewing the statutory scheme of reclamation law,
the Ninth Circuit wrote:
Originally, the Department of the Interior was given
responsibility not only for constructing the reclamation
projects, but also for administering the distribution of water
to agricultural users in a project service area. In 1926, however, Congress amended the reclamation laws to remove
from the Department the primary responsibility for distributing water and monitoring its use. Omnibus Adjustment
Act § 46, 43 U.S.C. § 423e. Instead, the Secretary of the
Interior was directed to enter into long-term water service
contracts with irrigation districts organized under state law.
It was left to the individual districts to execute subcontracts
with the actual users of water and to deliver the water.
Under this arrangement, the water districts, rather than the
United States, had responsibility for ensuring that recipients
of project water were complying with federal reclamation
law, including the acreage limitation and excess-land sale
requirement.26'
This statement was dictum, as the court upheld the challenged
RRA provisions with no further mention of who bears primary
responsibility for ensuring compliance with reclamation law.

259899 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003 (1990).
260 This section of the RRA is also known as the "hammer clause" because it requires
districts to choose between amending their contracts to conform to RRA requirements, or
paying full cost for all water delivered to tracts exceeding 160 acres. See id. at 801; 43
U.S.C. § 390cc(b) (1994).
261 899 F.2d at 804 (citations omitted).
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It seems to be generally accepted that a district must not deliver
water to a user who is not in compliance with reclamation laws.262
However, Peterson does not mean that districts are the primary
enforcers of reclamation law. Section 46 of the 1926 Omnibus
Adjustment Act - the section referred to by the Peterson court calls for contracts with irrigation districts, but under section 46 the
only clear district responsibility under these contracts is to pay the
cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining project works during the time they are under control of the United States.2 63 Therefore, there is a strong argument that the chief purpose of section 46
is to make districts responsible for arranging repayment, rather
than directly enforcing reclamation law requirements. 64
262 See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1989)
(reaffirming district duties established in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,
354 F. Supp. 252, 257-58 (D.D.C. 1973)); United States v. Quincy-Columbia Irrigation
Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487, 492 (E.D. Wash. 1986).
263 Section 46 provides in relevant part:

No water shall be delivered upon the completion of any new project or new
division of a project until a contract or contracts in form approved by the
Secretary of the Interior shall have been made with an irrigation district or
irrigation districts organized under State law providing for payment by the
district or districts of the cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining the
works during the time they are in control of the United States .... Such contract or contracts with irrigation districts hereinbefore referred to shall further
provide that all irrigable land held in private ownership by any one owner in
excess of one hundred and sixty irrigable acres shall be appraised in a manner
to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior and the sale prices thereof
fixed by the Secretary ... ; and that no such excess lands so held shall receive
water from any project or division if the owners thereof shall refuse to execute valid recordable contracts for the sale of such lands under terms and
conditions satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior and at prices not to
exceed those fixed by the Secretary of the Interior; ... upon proof of fraudulent representation as to the true consideration involved in such sales the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to cancel the water right attaching to the
land involved in such fraudulent sales ....
43 U.S.C. § 423e (1994).
264 Section 46 requires reclamation contracts to provide only that districts pay operation
and maintenance costs, rather than assume operation and maintenance responsibilities
directly. See 43 U.S.C. § 423e. Moreover, section 46 provides that no excess lands "shall
receive water from any project," but does not say whether the district or the government is
primarily responsible for denying water to these lands. Id. This omission is notable
because the statute clearly assigns responsibility for several other tasks. See id. And the
only real "enforcement" provision of section 46, which allows cancellation of water rights
for fraudulent misrepresentation, authorizes the Department of Interior to act, rather than
the district. See id. The purposes of section 46 and related provisions are discussed generally in Yellen v. Hickel, 335 F. Supp. 200, 203-04 (S.D. Cal. 1971), vacatedfor lack of standing, 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977). For further discussion of section 46, see also United States
v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977),
in which the court stated:
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While districts have certain duties under reclamation statutes,
regulations, and contracts, the U.S. government is ultimately
responsible for ensuring that project water users meet federal
requirements. This fact is well illustrated by Orange Cove Irrigation District v. United States,265 which involved the water users'
duty to submit eligibility certification forms.266 The Court of Federal Claims made the following broad statement: "The irrigation
districts, rather than the Bureau, are responsible for ensuring that
the recipients of project water comply with reclamation law,
including any eligibility requirements. The Bureau's role is limited
to regulating and to distributing subsidized water to the irrigation
districts. ' 267 The court went on to hold, however, that the district's
duties were limited to supplying users with blank forms and denying water to those users who failed to submit completed forms.
The government had attempted to place additional requirements
on the district but the court refused to hold the district to them,
largely because their wording was somewhat vague.268 In other
words, the court found that the district's duties went no further
than carrying out the specific requirements of reclamation statutes,
regulations, and contracts.

VIII.

FEDERAL POWERS AND DUTIES WITH RESPECT TO
PROJET WATER

The United States has both authorities and responsibilities with
respect to the water it develops through reclamation projects. Yet,
the cases do not clearly demarcate all of those authorities and
responsibilities, primarily because there are few cases defining the
issue. While the reclamation program has been in place for over
ninety years, the Bureau has generally sought to satisfy irrigators
Section 46 also requires the United States to enter into contracts with irrigation districts organized under state law in the area to be served by the reclamation project. In exchange for the government's promise to supply water,
the districts undertake to reimburse the United States for an allocated portion
of the costs of constructing the project and to withhold water from excess
lands within their boundaries for which recordable contracts have not been

executed.
535 F.2d at 1094. That case turned on the enforceability of the acreage limitation and
excess lands provisions of section 46, not on who was responsible for enforcing them. See

id.
265 28 Fed. Cl. 790 (1993).

266 The 1982 Reclamation Reform Act requires landowners to submit annual forms certifying that they are complying with the RRA. See 43 U.S.C. § 390ff (1994).
267 28 Fed. Cl. at 792.
268 See id. at 798-800.
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and other project beneficiaries, rather than exercise federal authority contrary to the water users' wishes. For most of its history and
in most of the West, the Bureau has avoided confrontation and
controversy by siding with irrigators, even when that meant ignoring clear requirements of federal law. 69 Thus, only a handful of
relevant cases exist. In fact, the vast majority of cases defining federal authority over project water come from two places: California's Central Valley, where the issues have included acreage
270
limitations, excess land sales, and environmental requirements;
and the Carson-Truckee-Pyramid Lake Basin in Nevada and California, where there has been a century-long tug of war between
271
irrigation demands and tribal, fishery, and environmental needs.
This tradition of inertia makes it somewhat difficult for the
Bureau to act today. As noted above, the federal government's
269 In the 1970s, individuals and groups who did not receive project water sued the
Bureau for failing to enforce basic, long-established provisions of reclamation law. The
government fought these suits and raised a wide variety of arguments, creating the impression that the Bureau would say anything to justify doing nothing. See County of Fresnov.
Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that National Land for People, Inc. was
entitled to intervene as of right in suit to enjoin Bureau from issuing regulations regarding
excess land sales); National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp.
449 (D.D.C. 1976) (issuing preliminary injunction directing Bureau to initiate formal
rulemaking to promulgate regulations regarding procedures and criteria for excess land
sales); Yellen v. Hickel, 335 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that residency requirement of the Reclamation Act of 1902 was still in effect and that the Bureau's failure to
enforce that requirement was "'contrary to any reasonable interpretation of the reclamation law .. , and ...destructive of the clear purpose of the national reclamation policy.").
Even in the 1990s, the Bureau remains unwilling to exercise its authority if such action
would upset irrigators. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp.
1533 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (invalidating regulations implementing the RRA because the Bureau
failed to perform an environmental impact statement.(EIS) beforehand).
270 Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), reviews the history of
the Central Valley Project and addresses the basic acreage limitation issues. A few of the
major cases arising from the Central Valley include Californiav. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978); O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 672 (1995);
Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 59
(1993); and Peterson v. United States Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003 (1990).
271Some of the cases arising from the Carson-Truckee basin include: Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); several cases under the name United States v. Alpine Land and
Reservoir Co., 983 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1993); 887 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 60 (1990); 878 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1989); 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983); Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Watt, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985); and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Morton, 354 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1973).
Brief summaries of the basin's water history are set forth in United States v. TruckeeCarson IrrigationDistrict,649 F.2d 1286, 1289-96 (9th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), and in Alpine Land & Reservoir
Co., 878 F.2d at 1219-20.
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responsibilities, rights, and remedies are often poorly defined by
case law, and the Bureau has enacted few regulations to clarify
them. Moreover, because irrigators have grown accustomed to a
very deferential Bureau of Reclamation, it will be politically difficult for the federal government suddenly to exercise power it has
rarely used. But while it may be reluctant to act, the federal government clearly has considerable authority over the use of project
water.
A.

Sources of Federal Authority over Project Water

The U.S. government owns reclamation project works, such as
dams and irrigation canals, 7 2 and it generally holds title to project
water rights in its name. 73 Ownership of these assets, however, is
not the primary source of federal authority over project water. In
fact, the Bureau gains very little authority over project water
merely by owning project facilities and water rights. The Supreme
Court has clearly stated that project water rights vest in individual
landowners who beneficially use the water, not in the government.274 Thus, federal law limits the Bureau's authority to determine the uses of project water which has been applied to beneficial
use, even when the water rights remain in the name of the United
States.275
Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, as interpreted by the
courts, further reduces the significance of federal ownership. 7 6
State law governs the appropriation and use of federal project
water, except where inconsistent with congressional directives. For
example, the federal government does not have primary authority
"[T~he courts have .... consistently reaffirmed the proposition that the United States
retains ownership of or an interest in management of project facilities." Authority to Provide Water to Stillwater Wildlife Management Area, 97 Interior Dec. 32, 44-45 (1989) (citing, inter alia, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937)).
273 BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, Comments & Responses app. at 124.
274 See supra Part V.B.1.
275 As the Supreme Court stated in Nevada v. United States:
the Government is completely mistaken if it believes that the water rights
confirmed to it by the Orr Ditch decree in 1944 for use in irrigating lands
within the Newlands Reclamation Project were like so many bushels of wheat,
to be bartered, sold, or shifted about as the Government might see fit. Once
these lands were acquired by settlers in the Project, the Government's "ownership" of the water rights was at most nominal; the beneficial interest in the
rights confirmed to the Government resided in the owners of the land within
the Project to which these water rights became appurtenant upon the application of Project water to the land.
463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983).
276 See supra Part IV.B.
272
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over transfers in place of use because the Ninth Circuit has held
that state law governs such transfers. The Bureau has only a right
to participate in state procedures for considering and approving
changes in use.277 And even though the federal government is the
undisputed owner of project dams, it remains subject to state control over dam operations to the extent that such laws and opera278
tions affect water distribution and use.
The Bureau's primary authority oer project water is based not
on what the government owns, but on what it gives. Every reclamation project provides a federal benefit - publicly subsidized
water - to certain users. In return, the United States has the
power to attach conditions to delivery of that benefit. Users must
accept those conditions if they want to receive project water.
The Supreme Court clearly established this basis for federal
authority over project water in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v.
McCracken.279 Ivanhoe was the first of many cases brought by California districts fighting the acreage limitation and excess lands
provisions of federal reclamation law. In considering the validity
of contract provisions limiting the delivery of project water to 160
acres, the Supreme Court specifically noted that ownership of
water rights was not the issue.28° Instead, the Supreme Court held
that the United States, having expended public funds to develop
reclamation projects,28 ' could place conditions on the receipt of
project benefits:
[a]lso beyond challenge is the power of the Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges ...
[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project
and to the over-all objectives thereof. Conversely, a State
cannot compel use of federal property on terms other than
those prescribed or authorized by Congress. Article VI of
277 See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 857-58 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
278 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, 791 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (E.D.
Cal. 1992) and cases cited therein.
279

357 U.S. 275 (1958).

"At the outset we set aside as not necessary to decision here the question of title to
or vested rights in unappropriated water. If the rights held by the United States are insufficient, then it must acquire those necessary to carry on the project .... " Ivanhoe Irrigation
Dist., 357 U.S. at 290-91 (citations omitted).
280

281See

id.
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the Constitution, of course, forbids state encroachment on
the supremacy of federal legislative action.28 2

After noting that irrigators would repay the federal government,
without interest, for only a fraction of the overall cost of the Central Valley Project, the Court continued:
[i]n short, the project is a subsidy, the cost of which will
never be recovered in full . . . .. In the light of these facts we
believe that the languago.of the Court in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942), is apposite: "It is hardly lack of
due process for the Government to regulate that which it
subsidizes."283

From the beginnings of the reclamation program, in 1902, the
federal government has had statutory authority to regulate the use
of the water it subsidizes.284 Moreover, many reclamation contracts contain a provision recognizing the authority of the Interior
Department to issue regulations. 285 And even though it has
entered into a contractual relationship to deliver water, the United
States retains its sovereign authority unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.286 Thus, as the provider of subsidized water under
reclamation laws and contracts, the federal government has authority over project water regardless of nominal ownership.287
282 Id. at 295 (citations omitted).
283 Id. at 295-96 (some citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit relied on
the Ivanhoe rationale in rejecting constitutional arguments against the acreage limitation
and excess land sales provisions in United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 677 F.2d 713,
719 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983).
284 Section 10 of the 1902 Reclamation Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior "to perform any and all acts and to make such regulations as may be necessary and proper for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act into full force and effect." 43 U.S.C.
§ 373 (1994). The 1982 Reclamation Reform Act reinforced this authority by giving the
Secretary of the Interior the power to prescribe regulations necessary to carry out that act
and other provisions of federal reclamation law. See 43 U.S.C. § 390ww(c)(1994).
285 The four contracts cited in supra notes 175-78 all contain some form of a provision
allowing the Department of Interior to prescribe regulations consistent with the contract.
See Island Irrigation Company contract, § 46(a); Roza Irrigation District contract, § 34;
North Unit Irrigation District contract, § 36(a); Tualatin Valley Irrigation District contract,
§ 33(a); see also, e.g., Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Secretary of the Dep't of the Interior, 742 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
286 See supra Part VI.A.-B.
287 The nominal ownership of project water rights may have considerable practical significance for the federal government. For example, if a state is considering an application
by a landowner or district to transfer project water to a new place of use, the state is less
likely to ignore the Bureau if the water rights are held by the United States. Moreover,
having nominal title to project water rights allows the federal government to face one less
legal or political argument that the water is not "theirs." It is, therefore, not surprising that
the Bureau has opposed efforts by the State of Oregon to issue project water right certificates in the name of an irrigation district, rather than the United States. See Letter from
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Specific Federal Powers Regarding Project Water

It is probably not possible to provide a complete list of the federal government's powers as they relate to project water. Again,
the Bureau of Reclamation has rarely been bold in exercising control over project water; thus, the nature and limits of federal
authority have not been fully explored. The relevant case law,
nonetheless, mentions an assortment of specific federal powers.
First, the United States has power to place conditions on water
deliveries from reclamation projects. z88 These conditions may be
of several types, such as required payments, 2 89 mandatory
reports, 9 ° or even constraints on water diversions.29 ' States cannot
override these conditions, at least those which are directed by
Congress.292
The United States also has the power to change the terms and
conditions for receipt of project water. In recent cases, the Ninth
Circuit has held, with apparent uneasiness, that the United States
can change its policies regarding the delivery of project water.
Thus, the court upheld the government's actions in applying the
provisions of the RRA,2 93 in renegotiating water service contracts
to increase districts' payment obligations,294 and in reallocating
Central Valley Project water to meet instream needs.2 95 The federal government, however, can only go so far in altering terms for
delivery of project water. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "ConJohn Keys III, Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation, to Martha Pagel, Director, Oregon Water Resources (July 22, 1996) (on file with author).
288 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Israel v. Morton:
[Plroject water ... is not there for the taking (by the landowner subject to
state law), but for the giving by the United States. The terms upon which it
can be put to use, and the manner in which right to continued use can be
acquired, are for the United States to fix. If such rights are subject to becoming vested beyond the power of the United States to take without compensation, such vesting can only occur on terms fixed by the United States.
549 F.2d 128, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1977).
289 See Flint v. United States, 906 F.2d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1990).
290 See Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 28 Fed. CI. 790, 797 (1993).
291 See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Secretary of the Dep't of the Interior, 742 F.2d.
527, 532 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
292 See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 673-74 (1978) (holding that the United
States must follow state law where it does not interfere with congressional directives).
293 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 821-25 (9th Cir.
1990); Peterson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1990).
294 See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993).,
295 See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1994).
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gress can change federal policy, but it cannot write on a blank

slate. "296
Another recognized governmental power is the authority to
withhold water from reclamation projects. Water users who fail to
meet certain federal requirements have no right to continue receiv-

ing project water, and the United States has authority to withhold
deliveries 297 until they comply. The Bureau has denied water to
users who violated project-specific regulations on water use,2 98
failed to submit required eligibility forms,2 99 or refused to sell their
excess lands within an agreed time. 300 The Bureau can also stop
deliveries to a user who has no contractual right to receive project
water 30 1 and reduce deliveries to those who are unreasonably wasting water.30 2 It is certainly possible that other kinds of violations
may also cause the Bureau to deny water to the offending user.
296

The court continued:

[T]he old policies deposit a moraine of contracts, conveyances, expectations
and investments. Lives, families, businesses, and towns are built on the basis
of the old policies. When Congress changes course, its flexibility is limited by
those interests created under the old policies which enjoy legal protection.
Fairness toward those who relied on continuation of past policies cuts toward
protection. Flexibility, so that government can adapt to changing conditions
and changing majority preferences, cuts against. Expectations reasonably
based on constitutionally protected property rights are protected against policy changes by the Fifth Amendment. Those based only on economic and
political predictions, not property rights, are not protected.
Madera Irrigation Dist., 985 F.2d at 1400. The Ninth Circuit's decision leaves a clear
impression that Madera was a close case and that the government prevailed only because
the court found that the United States had never surrendered its sovereign power in unmistakable terms.
297 While it may be a district, rather than the federal government, who directly shuts off
water to a noncomplying user, it is the federal government that requires the districts to
take the action. See, e.g., United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F.
Supp. 487, 492 (E.D. Wash. 1986).
298 See Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1989).
299 See Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 790, 795 (Fed. Cl.
1993).
300 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 819-20 (9th Cir.
1990).
301 See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir.
1989).
302See Yuma County Water Users' Ass'n v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. 548, 549-50 (D.D.C.
1964). This case arises from the Lower Colorado River Basin, where the United States has
unique authority over the allocation and distribution of water. See Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 579-81 (1963). Normally, state agencies are responsible for enforcing against
wasteful water use, but the Bureau would seem to have a continuing interest in ensuring
that project water is not wasted. Cf United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 887
F.2d 207, 212 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851,
854 (9th Cir. 1983).
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The government also has the power to enact rules and regulations to carry out reclamation law. Section 10 of the 1902 Reclamation Act provides that "[t]he Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to perform any and all acts and to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of car-

rying the provisions of this Act into full force and effect. ' 30 3 Section 224(c) of the Reclamation Reform Act contains a similarly

broad authorization for rulemaking. 3°4 Courts have used both pro-

visions to uphold the Department of the Interior's regulations and
other administrative actions.3 °5 Such regulations may affect the
exercise of project water rights, although they generally must not

conflict with state water laws.306 Nevertheless, the Bureau receives
great judicial deference in interpreting its own regulations. 7
A further power recognized by the courts concerns allocation of
project water among users. Courts have found that the reclama-

tion laws give the Bureau considerable authority to allocate project
water among eligible users. Thus, the Bureau has authority to

determine how' project water should be divided among different
43 U.S.C. § 373 (1994).
"The Secretary may prescribe regulations and shall collect all data necessary to carry
out the provisions of this title and other provisions of Federal reclamation law." Id.
§ 390ww(c) (1994).
305 See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 887 F.2d at 214 (upholding land classification regulations under section 10); United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F.
Supp. 487, 492 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (upholding reporting regulations under both section 10
and section 224(c)); Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 790, 800-01
(1993) (upholding Bureau authority to establish a deadline for returning required forms
under section 10). The Ninth Circuit has also held that section 10 authorized the Interior
Department's request for reserved water rights on behalf of an indian tribe affected by a
reclamation project. See United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286,
1300 (1981), affid in part,rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Nevada v. United States,
463 U.S. 110 (1983).
36 See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 887 F.2d at 211-14, where the Ninth Circuit upheld
Interior Department regulations that classified Newlands Project lands as "bench" or "bottom" lands. These regulations effectively determined how much water the lands could
receive because the controlling judicial decrees allowed bench lands to receive 4.5 acrefeet per acre, while bottom lands were limited to 3.5 acre-feet per acre. See 887 F.2d at
208. The government could not change those amounts because the court had earlier held
that the water duty of Newlands Project lands was determined-by actual beneficial use. See
Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d at 853-54. The court later found that the Interior
Department could adopt regulations classifying project lands as long as they did not violate
state-law standards of beneficial use: "State law regarding the acquisition and distribution
of reclamation water applies if it is not inconsistent with congressional directives.... Conversely, in the absence of congressional directives, DOI [Department of Interior] can regulate distribution, acquisition, and vested water rights if its regulations are not inconsistent
with state law." 887 F.2d at 212 (citations omitted).
307 See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 370 (9th Cir. 1989).
303
304
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authorized purposes, such as municipal and irrigation uses. 30 8 The
Bureau also has considerable discretion to allocate scarce water
supplies among users in the event of a drought.0 9 One court held
that a state cannot infringe on the Interior Department's authority
to allocate project water among users. 310 The Interior Department
has asserted its authority to deliver water for tribal and environmental needs in managing the Klamath reclamation project, relying
heavily on section 10 of the 1982 Reclamation Act.311 Courts have
shown deference to the Bureau's allocation decisions concerning
issues like sharing shortages during droughts 31 2 and determining
31 3
water needs of endangered species.
C. Federal Duties Regarding Project Water
1. Reclamation Law Requirements
In exercising its authority over project water, the United States
must meet several requirements that arise under federal law. The
Bureau may have a difficult time reconciling these various requirements. Many of the more interesting reclamation cases of the past
twenty-five years have involved conflicts between the Bureau's
traditional duties - delivering water for irrigation under reclamation laws and contracts, and complying with state water laws in the
process - and its more recently imposed (or heeded) duties under
308 See Central Arizona Irrigation and Drainage Dist. v. Lujan, 764 F. Supp. 582, 591 (D.
Ariz. 1991); see also Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262
(9th Cir. 1984) (upholding Secretary's decision to allocate Washoe Project water to meet
tribal and endangered species needs, rather than for municipal and industrial supply).
309 See Westlands Water Dist. v. United States Dep't of the Interior. 805 F. Supp. 1503,
1507 (E.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 10 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1993).
310 In Lujan, the court considered an Arizona statute that ranked water uses by order of
preference. The statute would have given irrigation priority over artificial groundwater
recharge, contrary to the Department of Interior's decision. See 764 F. Supp. at 591. The
court stated:
The problem with this statute is that, as it pertains to the operation of the
CAP [Central Arizona Project], if interpreted literally it would usurp the
power of the Secretary of the Interior to allocate water Among users. The
CAP is a federally subsidized project, and the federal government is authorized to allocate the resources which flow through the CAP.

The allocation and preferences given to CAP water seems to be within the
exclusive province of the Secretary of the Interior; once the preferences are
already established, the possible uses of that water are governed by state law.
Id. (citations omitted).
311See Regional Interior Solicitors Memo, supra note 21.
312 See Westlands Water Dist., 805 F. Supp. at 1507.
313 See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Nev.
1982), affd, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
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the environmental laws and the federal trust responsibility to
indian tribes. These are important cases because, as competition
for the West's finite water supplies grows more intense, there will
be increasing tension between "old" and "new" uses for project
water. The following paragraphs review these cases and other
authority regarding the federal government's legal duties in running the reclamation program.
The Bureau's most obvious responsibility is to meet the requirements of the reclamation laws,3 14 including generally applicable
laws such as the 1902 Reclamation Act, the 1939 Reclamation Project Act, and the 1982 RRA, as well as project authorizing acts and
other statutes affecting individual projects. Both kinds of laws
impose numerous duties. In broad terms, generally applicable laws
address matters such as contracts, payment requirements, acreage
limits, and disposal of excess lands,315 while project authorizing acts
specify such things as individual project purposes, limitations on
irrigated acreage for the project, federal spending, and repayment
terms.316
Some of the major federal responsibilities regarding project
water are set forth in section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act.317
The Bureau must comply with state water laws except those which
conflict with congressional directives.318 The federal government's
obligations and the limits on state power under section 8 are
explored in some detail in supra Part IV.B.
Section 8, by its own terms, seems to give the Bureau two additional duties: ensuring that (1) project water rights are appurtenant to the land irrigated and (2) use of project water under those
314 See Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300, 1317 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 559 F.2d 509
(9th Cir. 1977).
315 In authorizing a specific project, however, Congress has sometimes exempted that
project from the general provisions of reclamation law. The United States has fought
extended court battles with California districts over the applicability of certain limitations
to specific projects. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 352-53 (1980) (determining whether
acreage limitations apply to certain lands served by the Boulder Canyon Project); United
States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 677 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S.
1095 (1983) (determining whether lands served from Pine Flat Dam are subject to excess
lands provisions); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1094-96 (9th Cir.
1976).
316 See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-488, 74 Stat. 156 (authorizing the San
Luis Unit of the Central Valley Project); Act of Mar. 1, 1956, ch. 75, 70 Stat. 32 (authorizing Department of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Ventura River Project in California).
317 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1994).
318 See id. § 383.
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rights does not exceed "beneficial use. '3 19 According to the
Supreme Court, these duties are congressional directives regarding
project water that the Bureau must meet, even if there is a conflicting state law. In California v. United States, the Supreme Court
placed these requirements on the same plane as the acreage limitation,3 2 0 enforcement of which is certainly a federal duty.32' The
Ninth Circuit has held that beneficial use is to be determined by
state law, and the federal government cannot unilaterally determine what level of use is "beneficial. ' 322 Nevertheless, the Bureau
has a duty to see that project water deliveries are limited to benefi323
cial use.
319 Section 8 begins by requiring the Interior Department to proceed in conformity with
state water laws, but then states, "[t]hat the right to the use of water acquired under the
provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be
the basis, the measure and the limit of the right." Id. § 372.
320 In a series of footnotes, the Court acknowledged that certain congressional directives
in the 1902 Reclamation Act override inconsistent state laws:
Congress did not intend to relinquish total control of the actual distribution of
the reclamation water to the States. Congress provided in § 8 itself that the
water right must be appurtenant to the land irrigated and governed by beneficial use, and in § 5 Congress forbade the sale of reclamation water to tracts of
land of more than 160 acres.
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 668 n.21 (1978). Congress intended that, "spe-'
cific congressional directives which were contrary to state law regulating distribution of
water would override that law." Id. at 672 n.25. The Court later observed:
It is worth noting that the original Reclamation Act of 1902 was not devoid of
such directives. That Act provided that the charges for water should "be
determined with a view of returning to the reclamation fund the estimated
cost of construction of the project, and ... be apportioned equitably" and that
water rights should "be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use
...the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right"; the Act also forbade
sales to tracts of more than 160 acres. Despite these restraints on the Secretary, however, it is clear from the language and legislative history of the 1902
Act that Congress intended state law to control where it was not inconsistent
with the above provisions.
Id. at 678 n.31.
321 See United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 677 F.2d 713, 715-17 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983); see also United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.,
559 F.2d 509, 527 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 447
U.S. 352 (1980) (pertaining to federal duties regarding excess land sales); National Land
for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449, 450-51 (D.D.C. 1976).
322 In United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., the Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended to defer to state law governing beneficial use in passing the 1902 Reclamation Act, and that the "United States' interest in the determination of a user's water duty,
as declared by the statute, is to see that beneficial use is its measure and limit." 697 F.2d
851, 854, 856 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983). For a further discussion of the beneficial use requirement,
see United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 983 F.2d 1487,, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1992).
323 In the recent decision in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 115 S.Ct. 1933 (1995), the Supreme
Court again acknowledged that beneficial use of project water is a federal requirement
under section 8. See id. at 1942. More importantly, the Court allowed Wyoming to pro-
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In practice, the Bureau has failed to meet many of its duties
under the reclamation laws, particularly those which are unpopular
with irrigators. Lax oversight of project water use has created a
widespread problem of unauthorized uses, sometimes known as
"water spreading. '324 The Bureau has also received sharp criticism
for failing to implement the water conservation provisions of the
RRA.325
In the 1970s, the Bureau was sued after it refused to enforce the
327
residency requirement 326 and acreage limitation/excess lands
provisions of reclamation law. In defending these cases, the government raised a variety of arguments in justifying its practices, but
the courts ordered the Bureau to take action on these reclamation
law requirements.328 The Ninth Circuit made it clear that statutory
mandates survive both erroneous legal opinions and bureaucratic
inaction:
It is true that, in practice, the Department of the Interior did
not enforce the 160-acre limitation on lands in the Imperial
Irrigation District. This inaction was based at first upon the
Wilbur letter which was itself an informal opinion that is
legally incorrect and that does not even deal with the reclamation statute at issue in this case. Sometime thereafter, the
Department of the Interior abandoned justifying its inaction
on the analysis contained in the Wilbur letter but instead
decided against nonenforcement of the 160-acre limitation
because it had not been enforced before. Inaction based on
ceed with a claim against the United States for failing to limit deliveries of project water in
Nebraska to "beneficial use." See id.'at 1942-43. Wyoming argued that the Bureau's failure to enforce the beneficial use requirement violated an implied condition of the Supreme
Court's earlier decree governing the North Platte River. See id. at 1935.
324 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
325 See National Wildlife Federation, Water Resources Program, Gathering Dust: The
Bureau of Reclamation's Failure to Enforce Statutory Water Conservation Requirements
ii (Feb. 1991) (on file with author).
326 See, e.g., Yellen v. Hickel, 335 F. Supp. 200, 200 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
327 See National Land for People v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449, 449
(D.D.C. 1976). The United States did sue the Imperial Irrigation District to enforce acreage limitation/excess lands provisions, but did not appeal an adverse decision, leaving
intervenors to carry on the case. See United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d
509, 509 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nor. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S..352 (1980).
328 See National Land for People, 417 F. Supp. at 452-53; Yellen, 352 F. Supp. at 1317-19.
A later case states that National Land for People was dismissed as moot by the D.C. Circuit
based on federal assurances that the Bureau would expeditiously write rules and would
suspend excess land sales, but the court reinstated the appeal when the Bureau reneged on
its pledge to suspend sales. See County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 437 (9th Cir.
1980).
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previous inaction cannot be elevated into an administrative

determination to which the courts should defer.32 9
The Bureau also has a responsibility under the reclamation laws
to fulfill its contractual duties. 33° In performing its contracts, the
federal government has a duty of good faith and fair dealing.33 '
However, as noted above, the United States always maintains its
sovereign powers "unless surrendered in unmistakable terms," and
contract terms generally excuse the federal government if it fails to
deliver water for good cause.332
2.

Environmental and Tribal Trust Responsibilities

The Bureau also has a duty to comply with federal environmental laws including, but not limited to, the ESA 333 and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).3 34 The ESA provides that all
federal agencies shall, in consultation with the Interior Secretary,
ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any listed species.33 5 Section 7(a)(1) places an affirmative duty to conserve listed species on the Interior Department and
all other federal agencies.336 NEPA requires federal agencies to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment ' 337 and to conduct a less detailed environmental review
338
for federal actions not meeting this test.
The Bureau has taken certain actions to meet its ESA responsibilities in the Carson-Truckee-Pyramid Lake Basin, where it has a
duty to conserve two listed fish species.3 39 The Bureau has operated the multi-purpose Washoe Project to benefit the listed fish
329 Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d at 540. The Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the Boulder Canyon Project Act was intended to exempt landowners on that
project from the acreage limits of the reclamation laws. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352,
368-69 (1980).
330 See, e.g., Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717, 731
(E.D. Cal. 1993), affd, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
331 See Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 790, 800 (1993).
332 See supra Part VI.B.
333See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
334 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
335 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
336 See id. § 1536(a)(1).
337 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
338 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)(1996); see also Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1538 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (interpreting the EIS requirement in the
reclamation context).
339 See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 259 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
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and has refused to sell the water for municipal and industrial purposes.340 The Ninth Circuit, in Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy
District v. Clark, upheld these actions under the ESA, finding that
section 7(a)(1) and other provisions of the Act "direct that the Secretary actively pursue a species conservation policy."' 341 The
Bureau also consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as
required by ESA section 7(a)(2), before adopting a set of longterm operating criteria and procedures for water use on the Newlands Project.342 One reason for imposing these measures on the
project was to meet ESA requirements.343
The Bureau has shifted water from irrigation to fish and wildlife
uses on the Central Valley Project and has defended its action
under the ESA as well as under a provision of the 1992 Central
Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) mandating dedication
of 800,000 acre-feet of project water to ecological needs.344 The
Barcellos & Wolfsen court held that "Congress has mandated both
expressly and implicitly that the Bureau make water allocations for
environmental concerns, ' 345 and that project water users regardless of the water rights they hold - cannot require the
Bureau to disobey the law.3 46 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in O'Neill v. .United States,347 holding that the United
States had not violated its contracts with irrigation districts in following the statutory mandates of the ESA and the CVPIA.3 4 8
340 See id. at 259-60.

Id. at 262.
See Authority to Provide Water to Stillwater Wildlife Management Area, 97 Interior
Dec. 32, 40 (1989).
343 See id. at 37.
344 See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717, 721 (E.D.
Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 672 (1995). Section 3406(b)(2) of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and
Adjustment Act of 1992 requires the Interior Secretary to "dedicate and manage annually
eight hundred thousand acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield for the primary purpose
of implementing the fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by this title." Reclamation Projects Authorization Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575,
106 Stat. 4600, 4715.
345 Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc., 849 F. Supp. at 733 (citing section 3406(d) of the CVPIA
and section 7(a)(2) of the ESA).
346 See id. at 732. The ESA "provides no exemption from compliance to persons possessing state water rights, and thus [the water district]'s state water rights do not provide it
with a special privilege to ignore the Endangered Species Act." Id. (quoting United States
v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992)).
347 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
34 See id. at 687. The CVPIA also required the Bureau to comply with state water law
before reallocating water, but the United States already held project water rights sufficient
for the reallocation. See Westlands Water Dist. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 43 F.3d
457, 461 (9th Cir. 1994).
341
342
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These cases help define what the federal government can do
under the ESA, but there is unfortunately no case that determines
what the Bureau must do substantively to comply with the ESA in
operating a project. 34 9 The Bureau's determinations on the measures needed to comply with the ESA would be entitled to some
deference.350
A recent U.S. district court decision 351 delineates the ESA's procedural requirements where reclamation project operations may
affect listed species. The court stated that the Bureau violates the
ESA when it renews water service contracts or delivers water
under these contracts unless it can ensure that its action causes no
jeopardy to listed species. The Interior Department can meet this
ESA requirement only by completing a consultation and issuing a
biological opinion before any action, or by complying with ESA

section 7(d), which prohibits irretrievable commitments of
resources during the consultation process. 352 The Court rescinded

Central Valley Project water service contracts that were signed
before consultation was completed. 3
The Bureau must also comply with NEPA in preparing rules to

carry out the reclamation program, 4 as well as in committing.
water to a particular- use through a water marketing program or a

contract.355 On the other hand, NEPA does not require the Bureau

349 Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Clark specifically did not address this
issue. See 741 F.2d 257, 262 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985). In
another Carson-Truckee basin case, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe challenged the use of
Newlands Project water to irrigate lands on a Navy base. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit
found that the practice did not violate the ESA, largely because the Fish and Wildlife
Service issued a "no jeopardy" biological opinion. See id. at 1421. That case, however,
dealt with the Navy's duties under the ESA in leasing lands for irrigation with project
water, rather than with the Bureau's ESA responsibilities in operating the project itself.
See id. at 1412.
350 See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Nev.
1982), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
351 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, No. Civ. S-88-1658 LLK (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 16. 1997).
352 See id., slip op. at 16-17.
353 See id., slip op. at 24.
354 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1534 (E.D. Cal.
1991) (requiring the Bureau to prepare an EIS on rules to implement the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act).
355 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1979). In
Westlands Water District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, however, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the Bureau's reallocation of Central Valley Project water without complying with
NEPA, based on the specific and mandatory language of the CVPIA. See 43 F.3d 457, 462
(9th Cir. 1994).

1997]

Reclamation Project Water

to conduct an environmental review of its routine project operations.356 The Bureau has prepared detailed guidance on how it will
comply with NEPA.357

The Bureau must also comply with state laws that impose minimum instream flow or bypass requirements. The federal govern358
ment argued in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson

that it need not comply with California Fish and Game Code section 5937, which requires dam owners to allow enough water to
pass through their dams to maintain downstream fisheries.359 Section 5937 was a fish and wildlife law, argued the Bureau, not the
sort of state water law that the federal government need obey
under section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902.360 The court dis-

agreed, stating that because section 5937 limited the Bureau's ability to appropriate water for irrigation, it fell within the scope of
section 8 and therefore bound the federal government. 36 '
The federal government also has a fiduciary duty to protect the
trust assets of indian tribes.362 These assets include, among other
things, reserved water rights 363 and fishing rights, whether these
rights are claimed under treaty or executive order. 36 In Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,365 a federal district court
discussed the federal government's tribal trust responsibility:
356 See Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 234 (9th
Cir. 1990).
357 See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT HANDBOOK (1990).
358 791 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
359 See id. at 1428, 1431.
360 See id. at 1431.
361 See id. at 1435. The court stated:
[T]o the extent [section] 5937 preserves from appropriation by the Bureau of
an amount of water necessary for instreamuses, it relates to the appropriation
or use of water used in irrigation. Accordingly, [section] 5937 must be held to
be within the purview of state laws made applicable to the Bureau through
Section 8.
Id. The court recently held, in a later decision in the same case, that its procedural ESA
ruling deprived it of jurisdiction to decide whether section 5937 applied to the Bureau. See
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, Civ. No. S-88-1658 LKK, slip op. at 32-25
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1997).
362 The Ninth Circuit discussed the federal government's duty to protect Indian water
rights at some length in United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District,649 F.2d 1286,
1297-1301 (9th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nor. Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
363 See Joint Bd. of Control of Flathead, Mission & Jocko Irrigation Dists. v. United
States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988).
364 See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2546
(1996).
365 354.F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
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"[t]he United States, acting through the Secretary of Interior, 'has
charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility
and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who repretherefore be judged by
sent it in dealings with the Indians, should
' 366
the most exacting fiduciary standards.'
The Pyramid Lake v. Morton case defined the Bureau's tribal
trust duty in the operations of the Newlands Project. Newlands
was perhaps the original reclamation project, eyen predating the
creation of the Reclamation Service within the Interior Department.367 The project had long been operated to the detriment of
Pyramid Lake and the Paiute Tribe and to the benefit of irrigators,
who had rights to project water under various decrees and contracts.368 Beginning in 1967, the Interior Department had begun
issuing regulations covering Newlands Project water use in an
effort to provide some additional water to Pyramid Lake and the
Tribe. 369 The court in Pyramid Lake v. Morton, however, found
that the Interior Secretary had failed to meet his trust responsibility, which was to "insure to the extent of his power, that all water
not obligated by court decree or contract with the District [went] to
Pyramid Lake. ' 37 ° The court found that the regulations failed to
prevent waste by the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District or to limit
the irrigators to their decreed water rights.371 The court held the
regulations unlawful 372 and established a new, detailed set of operating criteria and procedures for the project to "fulfill the Secretary's fiduciary and legal obligations to the Tribe. ' 37 3 The
operating criteria and procedures have remained in place and
suffered by the United States and
enforceable despite legal defeats
374
the Tribe on related issues.
Tribes and irrigators fought over the allocation of project water
on Montana's Flathead Reservation in Joint Board of Control of
Id. at 256 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).
Only days after the 1902 Reclamation Act was passed, the Interior Secretary directed
the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to initiate the project. See Authority to Provide Water
to Stillwater Wildlife Management Area, 97 Interior Dec. 32, 34 (1989). The project proposal is set forth in a 1903 memorandum between the Secretary and the Director of the
USGS. See id.
368 See id. at 34-35.
369 See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians, 354 F. Supp. at 254-55.
370 Id. at 256.
371See id. at 257.
372 See id. at 258.
373 Id. at 261. The court attached the new operating criteria and procedures to the end
of the opinion. See id. at 262-66.
374 See Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1989).
366
367
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the Flathead, Mission and Jocko Irrigation Districts v. United
States.375 The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes had sued in
1985 to enjoin the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which
acted as "Officer-in-Charge" of the irrigation project, from distributing water to non-Indian irrigation districts in a manner that
severely depleted reservation streamflows and left tribal fisheries
irreparably harmed.376 After the tribes obtained a temporary
restraining order, the BIA in 1986 established an operating strategy that better protected the tribal fishery but decreased the
amount of water available to the districts. 377 The districts then
sued, arguing that the BIA had abused its discretion by adopting
the operating strategy without considering the irrigators' rights.378
The Ninth Circuit held that even though the 0Flathead Reservation
water rights had not been adjudicated, the BIA still had to allocate
water to the tribes under their reserved rights, which were senior to
the district water rights.379 Furthermore, in determining the quantity of water that must be delivered to38protect
tribal fishing rights,
0
the BIA acts as trustee for the tribes.

375 832 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988).
376 See id. at 1129-32. The Department of the Interior has authority separate from the
reclamation laws to provide for irrigation on Indian reservations. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 381-390
(1994); Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1467-68 (10th Cir. 1994).
377 See Joint Bd. of Control,832 F.2d at 1129.
378 See id. The district court issued the preliminary injunction sought by the districts.
See Joint Bd. of Control of the Flathead, Mission & Jocko Irrigation Dists. v. United States,
646 F. Supp. 410, 427 (D. Mont. 1986), iev'd, 832 F.2d 1127 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1007 (1988).
379 See Joint Bd. of Control, 832 F.2d at 1132. Even though the Joint Board of Control
case involved an indian irrigation project, its holding seems equally applicable to reclamation projects because the case turned on federal agency duties under prior appropriation
and trust principles rather than on any special power or duty relating to Indian projects.
See id.
380See id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district cpurt, which had held that the BIA
must provide a "just and equal distribution" of all reservation waters. See Joint Bd. of
Control, 646 F. Supp. at 426. According to the Ninth Circuit:
The action of the BIA in establishing stream flow and pool levels necessary to
protect tribal fisheries is not unreviewable. In making its determination, however, the BIA is acting as trustee for the Tribes. Because any aboriginal fishing rights secured by treaty are prior to all irrigation rights, neither the BIA
nor the Tribes are subject to a duty of fair and equal distribution of reserved
fishery waters. Only after fishery waters are protected does the BIA, acting
as Officer-in-Charge of the irrigation project, have a duty to distribute fairly
and equitably the remaining waters among irrigators of equal priority.
Joint Bd. of Control, 832 F.2d at 1132.
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The United States' specific duties in protecting tribal trust assets
will obviously depend on the circumstances of a given situation.381
The Pyramid Lake v. Morton and Joint Board of Control cases,
however, clearly show that the federal government has a duty to
protect tribal interests even where a tribe's reserved water rights
are unadjudicated and non-Indian irrigators have long been the
favored recipients of project water. Federal and state courts have
reached similar conclusions regarding federal duties in operating
water for the tribal fishery of the
the Yakima Project to provide
382
Yakama Indian Nation.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Controversies over the use of the West's public natural resources
are often argued in shorthand terms that oversimplify and mischaracterize the real issues. So it is with the debate over who controls project water. Simple notions of "federal supremacy," "state
sovereignty, ' and "private property" all are valid to some degree,
but none comes close to telling the whole story.
The western states have broad authority over their waters, but
they cannot trump congressional directives. Water users have certain property rights in project water, but these rights are subject to
important limitations. Districts, also, have significant rights and
responsibilities, but these entities essentially play the role of manager and middleman. The United States has extensive powers and
duties under federal law with respect to project water, even though
the federal government has largely deferred to state water law and
does not hold the beneficial interest in project water rights.
Thus, the federal government, states, districts, and private water
users all have some rights and responsibilities with respect to pro381Two other cases have indicated that, in the Carson-Truckee-Pyramid Lake Basin, the
tribal trust responsibility may coincide with the Bureau's duties under the ESA. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1421 (9th Cir.
1990); Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704, 713 (D. Nev.
1982), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985). Obviously, this may not be the case where there are tribal
trust assets but no endangered species or where the Bureau's trust duties include supplying
irrigation water to a tribe. See Authority to Provide Water to Stillwater Wildlife Management Area, 97 Interior Dec. 32, 39 n.6 (1989).
382 See Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032,
1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985); Washington Dep't of Ecology v.
Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Super. Ct. Yakima County, Wash. Apr. 2, 1996) (Memorandum Opinion Regarding Motion to Limit Treaty Water Right For Fish To Natural Flow);
Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Super. Ct. Yakima County,
Wash. Dec. 22, 1994) (Memorandum Opinion Regarding "Flushing Flows").
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ject water. The specific nature of those rights and responsibilities
must be determined case-by-case, based on a number of factors.3 83

Most of those factors are variable, and few are constant.
The question, "Whose water is it?" is too involved to be
answered on a bumper sticker, and too important to be disregarded
or misunderstood. The Bureau delivers a vast amount of water,
chiefly for irrigation, especially in California and the Pacific Northwest. Depending upon who controls that water, it may continue to
be used for irrigation, or it may go to "new" purposes such as cities,
high-tech industries, or instream flows. The answer may determine
the fate of many farmers, native species, and communities whose
existence is closely tied to the rivers of the West.

383 For further information on reclamation project water issues, particularly those
related to environmental problems, see generally NATURAL RESOURCEs LAW CENTER,
supra note 22.

